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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2014, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) made waves among international criminal law scholars
and practitioners. 1 In her briefing to the United Nations Security
Council (the UN Security Council or Council), Prosecutor Bensouda
proclaimed that she would suspend the ten-year-long investigation
and five-year-long outstanding warrant against the Sudan’s President Al-Bashir, 2 stating:
[G]iven the Council’s lack of foresight on what should happen in
Darfur, I am left with no choice but to put investigative activities
in Darfur on hold as I shift resources to other urgent cases, especially those where trial is approaching. It should thus be clear to
the Council that unless there is a change of attitude and approach to Darfur in the near future, there will continue to be little or nothing to report to it for the foreseeable future. 3

It is rare for any Prosecutor to publicly announce that she is no
longer actively investigating an open case or seeking jurisdiction
over a high-profile indictee, while at the same time leaving charges
pending. The Prosecutor of the ICC’s unprecedented confrontation
of the Council highlighted a critical juncture in the ongoing relationship between the political and powerful Council and the independent Office of the Prosecutor. Yet, the Prosecutor did not maintain this stance for long. In her June 2015 briefing, the Prosecutor
“clarified” these remarks by stating that she is not halting proceedings against Al-Bashir, she is merely devoting more resources to
other areas. 4 Her posturing, nonetheless, shines a light on the potential for the ICC to delay or simply say no to the powerful UN Security Council’s referrals in the future, while at the same time
demonstrating the limits of this strategy.

1. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, OTP Suspends Darfur Investigation, OPINIO JURIS (Dec.
12, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/12/12/otp-suspends-darfur-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/PZ82-N5NM].
2. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7337th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7337 (Dec. 12,
2014) (“It is becoming increasingly difficult for me to appear before the Council to update it
when all I am doing is repeating the same things I have said over and over again, most of
which are well known to the Council . . . . To date, none of those individuals have been
brought to justice, and some of them continue to be implicated in atrocities committed
against innocent civilians . . . . I remain open to constructively engage with the Council on
the Darfur issue. What is needed is a dramatic shift in the Council’s approach to arresting
Darfur suspects.”).
3. Id. at 2.
4. U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7478th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7478 (June 29, 2015).
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In its fifteenth year of operations, the ICC continues to be
plagued by criticism about its effectiveness. 5 Perceived bias of the
ICC, to the extent that Rome Statute 6 States Parties’ protests are
sincere, has damaged States Parties’ understandings of the independence and fairness of the ICC. In January 2016, the African Union (AU) recommended that its Open-Ended Committee of African
Ministers on the ICC consider a roadmap on possible withdrawal
from the ICC. 7 Burundi 8 recently withdrew from the ICC. In addition, as this Article goes to print, Gambia 9 and South Africa 10 have
both withdrawn from, and more recently, rejoined the ICC. 11 Corre5. See generally Joseph M. Isanga, The International Criminal Court Ten Years
Later: Appraisal and Prospects, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 235, 241 (2013) (describ-

ing the ICC’s achievements over its first ten years as well as potential issues related to the
Rome Statute, the Security Council, and the ICC’s relationship with non-parties like the
United States).
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
7. Elise Keppler, Dispatches: On Africa and the ICC, Don’t Buy All the Hype, HUM.
RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 1, 2016, 10:30 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/01/dispatchesafrica-and-icc-dont-buy-all-hype [https://perma.cc/PU3N-5445] (“But the decision is not a
call for mass withdrawal, nor is it the first time withdrawal has been raised but not materialized.”). In 2011, the African Union proposed an unsuccessful amendment to the Rome
Statute that would permit States to request the Council to defer pending matters, and
absent a reply from the Council within six months, allow the General Assembly to do so.
Amendments To Be Considered at the Ninth Session of the Assembly, ASP NEWSL.
(ICC/Assembly of States Parties), Jan. 2010, at 6; African Union [AU], Progress Report of

the Commission on the Implementation of the Decisions of the Assembly of the African
Union on the International Criminal Court, EX.CL/952(XXVIII) (Jan. 23–28, 2016),

http://www.jfjustice.net/userfiles/file/ICC%20Report%20on%20progress%202016%2001ICC%
20EX%20CL%20952%20(XXVIII)%20_E%20(1).PDF. As this Article goes to press, South
Africa, Gambia, and Burundi announced plans to withdraw from the ICC. Elise Keppler,
African Members Reaffirm Support at International Criminal Court Meeting, HUM. RIGHTS
WATCH (Nov. 17, 2016, 6:37 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/17/african-membersreaffirm-support-international-criminal-court-meeting [https://perma.cc/2EBH-WTKT].
8. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Burundi: Withdrawal,
C.N.805.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CN/2016/CN.805.2016-Eng.pdf.
9. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Gambia: Withdrawal,
C.N.862.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Nov. 11, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CN/2016/CN.862.2016-Eng.pdf; U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Gambia:
C.N.62.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10
Withdrawal
of
Notification
of
Withdrawal,
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.62.2017-Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7EJ-P4UJ].
10. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, South Africa: Withdrawal,
C.N.786.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 25, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf; U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, South
Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal, C.N.121.2017. TREATIES-XVIII.10
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.121.2017-Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6HEL-TLWS].
11. See Jake Flanagin, South Africa Is Withdrawing from the International Criminal
Court, QUARTZ AFR. (Oct. 11, 2015), http://qz.com/521724/south-africa-is-withdrawingfrom-the-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/7756-EBMZ]; Jacey Fortin, The
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spondingly, supporters of the ICC worry about its longevity and
many have curtailed their expectations of the ICC’s potential. 12 One
of the ICC’s many challenges is its relationship with the most powerful organ of the United Nations system, the UN Security Council.
The UN Security Council, with its three permanent, veto-wielding
members that are not States Parties to the Rome Statute, has not
consistently supported the ICC, even after it referred challenging
cases to the ICC. These cases are distinguishable from others as
they involve States that are not parties to the Rome Statute. The
Council’s lack of consistent support for, and importantly, its members’ active undermining of, the ICC’s work has affected the ICC’s
capacity to effectively, 13 and meaningfully, 14 investigate and prosecute Council-referred situations.
Continent Versus the Court: African Union Deliberates Withdrawal from the ICC, INT’L

BUS. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/continent-versus-courtafrican-union-deliberates-withdrawal-icc-1422434; Mark Kersten, Sudan, South Africa and
the Future of the International Criminal Court in Africa, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/13/sudan-south-africaand-the-future-of-the-international-criminal-court-in-africa/; Michael Pizzi, South Africa
Threatens to Withdraw from ICC, Alleging Anti-African Bias, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 12,
2015, 3:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/12/south-africa-threatens-towithdraw-from-icc-alleging-anti-african-bias.html [https://perma.cc/JWU7-D93D]. This
Article does not attempt to predict the likelihood that the AU will withdraw from the Rome
Statute, but instead treats the possibility as real. Articles on this subject exist elsewhere.
See, e.g., AU Members States Could Withdraw from ICC, ENEWS CHANNEL AFR. (June 15,
2015,
7:01
PM),
http://www.enca.com/africa/au-members-states-could-withdraw-icc
[https://perma.cc/4XKQ-X58Z]; ICTJ Deplores ANC Resolution to Lead Africa-Wide Withdrawal from ICC, SABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2015, 20:58), http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/
080bb3804a322a0bafbbefa53d9712f0/ICTJ-deplores-ANC-resolution-to-lead-Africa-widewithdrawal-from-ICC-20151310; Kenya Parliament Votes to Withdraw from ICC,
ALJAZEERA (Sept. 5, 2013, 21:20), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/
201395151027359326.html [https://perma.cc/WNM8-NR4K]; Leaders Renew Calls for Kenya to Withdraw from Rome Statute, DAILY NATION (Sept. 6, 2015),
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Leaders-renew-calls-for-Kenya-to-withdraw-fromRome-Statute/-/1064/2860688/-/enilx9/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/9GEG-PSWP].
12. See, e.g., Trevor Sutton, John Norris, & Carolyn Kenney, Preserving International
Justice in the Age of Donald Trump, CTR. FOR AM. PROGESS, (Jan. 23, 2017, 9:02 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/01/23/296975/preservinginternational-justice-in-the-age-of-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/MGF2-RDZ8] (“While
international justice has made a quantum leap over the past 25 years, it has been a highly
uneven and sometimes troubled journey. . . . Today, the future of international criminal
justice is more in doubt than at any point since the end of the Cold War.”).
13. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the many possible definitions
of effectiveness. This Article’s definition of effectiveness is unpacked further in Part IV.
Rather, for purposes of this Article, I adopt an understanding of goal-oriented effectiveness,
centering on the goals of the Rome Statute’s mandate holders. These goals are not merely
primary norm compliance and dispute resolution, but also regime support, and regime
legitimization, with tradeoffs between each and strengths in various areas. For such a definition, see Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A GoalBased Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 226 (2012) (asking, “Are international courts effective tools for international governance?”). See also James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54
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The ICC is an independent tribunal, 15 charged by its mandate
holders, States Parties, to prosecute “the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole.” 16 Despite the
ICC’s formal autonomy, however, its founding treaty, the Rome
Statute, permits the powerful and political UN Security Council,
inter alia, to refer situations to the ICC, including those in nonState Parties, and to defer the ICC’s ongoing proceedings. 17
Conventional wisdom would suggest that the relatively powerless ICC should cooperate with the Council, and that the Council
should refer cases of massive atrocities, such as the situation in
Syria to the ICC. 18 A key concern underpinning this position is that
VILL. L. REV. 1 (2009); Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law:
Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2009);
Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 434,
441 (2006); Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157

U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2008).
14. This Article assumes that effectiveness consists of more than just successful prosecutions. As Shany’s conception acknowledges, courts can make meaningful contributions
to longer-term, systemic effects on the development and legitimacy of governance, quite
apart from the outcomes of specific cases. Shany, supra note 13, at 231-32.
15. International tribunals are those that are created by international law, include
independent judicial bodies, and have the authority to apply law to the cases before them.
Shany, supra note 13, at 225-26.
16. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl.
17. Id. at art. 13(b) (explaining that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction when the
Security Council refers a situation to the Court); id. at art. 16 (allowing the Security Council to defer situations for a period of twelve months). Other provisions of the Rome Statute
that address the relationship between the U.N. Security Council and the International
Criminal Court are: art. 87(7) (allowing the Court to refer requests for cooperation to the
Security Council) and art. 115(b) (allowing the United Nations to provide funds to the
Court, especially in relation to situations referred by the Security Council). Id. at art. 87(7),
115(b). Article 15 of the Rome Statute will be updated to further clarify the U.N. Security
Council’s interaction with the Prosecutor’s investigation of crimes of aggression. Id. at art. 15
ter (amended by Rome Statute Res. RC/Res.5, at 20 (June 11, 2010)) (noting that after 2017,
the Court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression if referred by the Council).
18. See, e.g., Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights Situations and
Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives, Rep. of the G.A., U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/70/L.47, at 3 (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/
%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_c_3_70_l_47.pdf (“Recalling the
statements made by the Secretary-General, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council that crimes against
humanity and war crimes are likely to have been committed in the Syrian Arab Republic,
noting the repeated encouragement by the High Commissioner for the Security Council to
refer the situation to the International Criminal Court, and regretting that a draft resolution
was not adopted notwithstanding broad support from Member States . . . .”); Chris McGreal,
UN Security Council Is Failing Syria, Ban Ki-moon Admits, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2015, 05:52
EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/un-security-council-is-failing-syria-banki-moon [https://perma.cc/9HYF-4G9E] (“The UN secretary general told th[e] Guardian
that Russia and China should ‘look beyond national interest’ and stop blocking security
council action on the conflict in Syria . . . .”); Letter from Thomas Gürber, Chargé
d’affaires, to Mohammad Masood Khan, President of the Security Council
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/29293.pdf
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victims of atrocities will otherwise languish if the Council does not
refer, and if the ICC does not pursue Council referrals. Indeed, the
concern is that the very purposes of the ICC, including to end impunity and to deter future atrocities, will be undermined if the ICC
fails to act against wrongdoers when it has jurisdiction. Yet, despite
repeated pressure from many Member States of the General Assembly, as of January 2017, the Council has refused to refer situations to the ICC since its referral of Libya in 2011. 19 It is highly
likely, however, that the Council will again use the relatively lowcost tool (for the Council) of referring a situation to the Court in
the future.
Particularly in light of recent developments in the Office of the
Prosecutor, 20 this Article challenges the conventional wisdom that
the Prosecutor should devote resources to investigating and charging in the case of a future Council referral. It contemplates that the
interests of justice might lead the Prosecutor to seriously consider
declining investigating or prosecuting a Council referral. Further, it
explores how the Prosecutor might instead use her “weapons of the
weak” 21—declination coupled with an explanation—to engage the
Council earlier and more productively (for the ICC) in the future.
Although prosecutors in common law systems often exercise discretion without explanation, the ICC Prosecutor has wisely developed
[https://perma.cc/6XQ5-AETB];

Questions

and

Answers,

Syria

and

the

International

Criminal

Court

HUM.
RIGHTS
WATCH,
1
(Sept.
2013),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Q%26A_Syria_ICC_Sept2013_en_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DH8K-Q9RY] (“The Security Council, with what is called an ‘ICC referral,’ could give the court jurisdiction stretching back to the day the Rome Statute entered
into force, on July 1, 2002. . . . The Security Council, however, has failed to act on other key
occasions when there was strong evidence of widespread and serious international crimes
and little prospect of local accountability. . . . Human Rights Watch believes that the court
should be given jurisdiction, considering the evidence that serious crimes have been committed
in Syria, the pervasive climate of impunity there, and the grave nature of many of the abuses.”); UN Security Council: Heed Call for Justice in Syria, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 14, 2013,
11:54 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/14/un-security-council-heed-call-justice-syria
[https://perma.cc/YHW9-XWCC].
19. Indeed, as described further, infra, in Section III.C., in light of the obstacles, recently there has been much discussion about creating ad hoc tribunals. See, e.g., H.R. Res.
269, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding
the need for investigation and prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity,
whether committed by officials of the Government of Syria or other parties to the civil war
in Syria, and calling on the President to direct the United States representative to the
United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United States to immediately promote the
establishment of a Syrian war crimes tribunal, and for other purposes.”).
20. For the recently adopted strategy, see Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization (Sept. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Policy
Paper on Case Selection], https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_
Case-Selection_Eng.pdf.
21. JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT
RESISTANCE (1985). I am indebted to Professor Keith Bybee for this reference.
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a tradition of transparency—explaining the Office’s decisions in an
attempt to offset claims of such bias. 22
The Prosecutor’s use of her discretion in the interests of justice 23
to decline future Security Council referrals could affect States Parties’ perceptions of the ICC’s independence, 24 its normative validity, 25 and also its effectiveness. Of course, the possibility of declination is by no means a panacea for all of the ICC’s challenges—the
impacts of declining a Council referral would be both negative and
positive. Concerns that this proposal would raise and limitations to
the proposal are addressed below. In light of the challenges that the
ICC faces, this Article explains, however, why the Prosecutor

22. Predictably, and understandably, not all of the constituency of the Rome Statute is
persuaded by the Prosecutor’s policy papers and explanations. See, e.g., William A. Schabas,
Feeding Time at the Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. JUST. TODAY (Nov. 23, 2016),
https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/icc-prosecutors-perpetuationof-the-fiction-of-objectivity/ [https://perma.cc/97QM-WXUQ]. Nevertheless, some scholars
and constituents contend that these documents offer a valuable basis for engagement and
signal a desire to be held accountable. See Ekaterina Trendafilova, A Good Working Document of the Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. JUST. TODAY (Nov. 23, 2016),
https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/the-case-selection-andprioritisation-paper--a-good-working-document-of-the-office-of-the-prosecutor/
[https://perma.cc/J9RZ-KUSR]; Alex G. Whiting, Finding Strength Within Constraints, INT’L
CRIM. JUST. TODAY (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.international-criminal-justicetoday.org/arguendo/icc-prosecutors-constraints-and-strengths/ [https://perma.cc/QW42-7Z3E].
23. A case may be inadmissible by reason of complementarity, insufficient gravity, or
the more general concern of the interests of justice. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 17,
53. For articles discussing the interests of justice standard, see also Robert H. Mnookin,

Rethinking the Tension Between Peace and Justice: The International Criminal Prosecutor
as Diplomat, in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: PROMISE AND CONSTRAINTS 69 (Martha
Minow et al. eds., 2015); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583
(2007); Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor’s Discretion Not to Proceed in the “Interests of
Justice,” 50 CRIM. L.Q. 305 (2005).
24. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 955 (2005) (arguing

that constrained judicial independence in international tribunals enhances effectiveness).
25. There are many forms of legitimacy. Here I refer to sociological legitimacy, or the
beliefs of those actors (i.e. States Parties, United Nations members, NGOs, individuals)
involved in the process of international criminal law that the legal institution ought to be
obeyed. Sociological legitimacy, as contrasted with political philosophical understandings of
legitimacy, is not the same as moral legitimacy, nor is it the same as Habermasian legitimacy. According to David Beetham’s noted definition, sociological legitimacy has the following components: 1) legality or rule conformity, 2) normative validity, and 3) appropriate
actions. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 271 (Peter Jones & Albert Weale
eds., 1st ed. 1991). “Rules . . . are well grounded in normative beliefs accepted by the population(s) . . . .” Id. at xiii. “[T]he starting point for [analysis of] social scientific
[legitimacy] . . . is to understand these principles of legitimacy and the practices which
support it in their own terms, not those we ourselves may endorse.” Id. at xi; see also IAN
HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL 7 (2007) (“ ‘Legitimacy,’ as I use the term, refers to an actor’s normative belief
that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”).
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should consider the option to decline entirely to investigate or prosecute Council referrals and to issue an explanation for doing so. 26
This inquiry fills a gap in the literature about prosecutorial discretion at the international level by focusing specifically on the relationship between the Prosecutor and the Council; a relationship
that has broader implications for both institutions, as well as for
the goals of international criminal justice generally. 27 Professor
Ohlin has argued that the Prosecutor must investigate referrals
from the UN Security Council, as she is effectively mandated to investigate as a part of a “security” court in the case of referrals. 28
Other scholars understand it to be within the Prosecutor’s legal
power to decline Council referrals, but it is less clear why, when,
and how she might do so. 29
Regarding the relationship between the Prosecutor and the
Council, I have argued elsewhere that the first ICC Prosecutor
treated the Council as an institutional ally while seeking to preserve his independent judgment. 30 He sought to work with the
Council to achieve his mandate, but endeavored to (at least formally) maintain his independence and discretion. 31 For the current
26. The Prosecutor uses preliminary examinations as a device to monitor progress in
different situations, and would still preliminarily examine a Council-referred situation.
There are, of course, a number of trade-offs that she will need to consider in deciding when
to decline a Council referral. In a separate draft, I consider those trade-offs.
27. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability
of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510
(2003); Greenawalt, supra note 23; Mnookin, supra note 23; Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko,
Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Courts and International Tribunals, 3 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 124 (2005); Héctor Olásolo, The Prosecutor of the ICC Before the Initiation of
Investigations: A Quasi-Judicial or a Political Body?, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003);
Webb, supra note 23.
28. According to some legal scholars such as Professor Ohlin, the Prosecutor had the
obligation to investigate and prosecute Council-referred situations. Jens David Ohlin,
Peace, Security, and Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 185, 186 (Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2009); see
also George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, The ICC—Two Courts in One?, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 428 (2006).
29. See Danner, supra note 27, at 519.
30. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 24.
31. See C. Cora True-Frost, The International Civil Servant: How the First Prosecutor
Engaged the U.N. Security Council, in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR 251, 251 (Martha
Minow et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter True-Frost, International Civil Servant] (arguing that
the first Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, “chose to
craft himself as an international civil servant, bound to independently apply the law and
disregard politics” and “engaged in both regular contact and a markedly less hostile relationship” with the U.N. Security Council). Since his term as Prosecutor has ended, Luis
Moreno-Ocampo has been more candid about his views of the Council. Luis MorenoOcampo Talks to Richelle Carey, ALJAZEERA AM. (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/talk-to-al-jazeera/articles/2015/10/23/luis-morenoocampo-talks-to-richelle-carey.html.
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Prosecutor to decline a referral and explain that she is doing so because she knows that, for example, the Council will not support its
referral of a non-consenting State, or that the ongoing conflict in
this non-consenting State will prove too challenging for ICC intervention absent Council support would admittedly be a bold action.
Such an action might in turn, however, limit political gamesmanship by the Council, even as it also might open the Prosecutor to
claims of bias. Correspondingly, Council members might then be
forced either to internalize the cost of Council referrals or to fully
cooperate with the ICC on existing Council referrals. 32
The ICC’s relationship with the Council has affected a number of
areas related to the Court’s general effectiveness, including support
for the international criminal law (ICL) norms it promotes, its capacity to resolve international disputes and problems, broader support for the regime of ICL, perceptions of legitimacy of international
authority, and its more idiosyncratic goals. While no prosecutorial
decision is immune from critique, the Prosecutor’s power to delay or
decline a Security Council referral in the interests of justice can be
supported by the text of the Rome Statute, case law, and the practice of both the Court and the Council. 33
Due to the Court’s limited jurisdiction and relationship with the
Council, the Prosecutor must constantly balance selective justice
concerns, on the one hand, and effectiveness concerns on the other.
Some recent developments in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
may help address some effectiveness and fairness issues stemming
from, in particular, its relationship with the Council. For example,
the Prosecutor recently opened an investigation into the situation in
Georgia. 34 This proprio motu investigation not only marks the ICC’s
first non-African investigation, but it also implicates permanent
Council member, Russia. It may thus help to counter the selective
justice concern that permanent Council members, which are nonState Parties, will never be accountable for violations of ICL. 35 In
32. See infra Section III.C. While the Prosecutor has previously argued that there is a
presumption for prosecution in the interests of justice, for reasons I discuss below, that
presumption might be discounted in the case of Council-referrals. This Article does not
develop a typology of when the Prosecutor can decline a Council referral; it rather offers a
starting point for developing such a typology.
33. See infra Part III.
34. For more information on the Georgia investigation, see Situation in Georgia, INT’L
CRIM. COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia [https://perma.cc/QB4J-NBGN].
35. No: ICC-01/15, Corrected Version of “Request for Authorisation of an Investigation
Pursuant to Article 15”, 16 October 2015, ICC-01/15-4-Corr (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2160852.pdf (“The Prosecutor hereby requests authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber I, pursuant to article 15(3) of the Rome Statute, to
proceed with an investigation into the Situation in Georgia covering the period from 1 July
2008 to 10 October 2008, for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed
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addition, in order to increase its effectiveness, the Office of the
Prosecutor released a Case Selection Policy in September 2016. 36
Strategic goals for 2016-2018 include ensuring “a basic size which
can respond to the demands placed upon the Office so that it may
perform its functions with the required quality, effectiveness and
efficiency.” 37 The Office is, inter alia, seeking to “align the demands
placed upon the Office with the realities of what may be achieved.” 38
Despite the tension between these goals, the Prosecutor can exercise her discretion to enhance the long-term prospects for the
Court. Unlike the Council, the Prosecutor can be held accountable
for her decision to decline to investigate or to prosecute—the PreTrial Chamber (PTC) may review such a decision. 39 Indeed, in 2015,
a majority of the PTC denied the Prosecutor’s decision not to open
an investigation in the Mavi Marmara situation, and requested the
Prosecutor to reassess the situation’s gravity. 40 The Appeals Chamber of the ICC, however, implicitly endorsed broad prosecutorial
discretion when it ruled inadmissible the Prosecutor’s appeal of the
PTC’s decision. The Appeals Chamber decision, as well as the fact of
the PTC review, support the idea that the Prosecutor of the ICC
might use declination to avoid the negative effects of the Council’s
lack of support, while at the same time optimizing as much of the
potential for productive collaboration with the Council as possible.
in and around South Ossetia.”). The opening of an investigation in the situation in Georgia
implicates the interests of Russia, a P5 member, and will raise unprecedented issues for
the Court, in particular relating to its relationship with the Security Council.
36. Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization, supra note 20.
37. Int’l Crim. Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, at 6 ¶ 4 (July
6, 2015) [hereinafter, Strategic Plan 2016], https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDH2-UXA7].
38. Id. at 7 ¶ 6.
39. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 53(3)(a)-(b) (“At the request of the State
making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council under article 13, paragraph (b),
the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not
to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision. In addition, the PreTrial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed
if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor
shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”).
40. Case No. ICC-01/13 OA, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal
against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation,” ¶ 50–65 (Nov. 6, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2152672.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ8J-P5VT] (“[T]he
ultimate decision as to whether to [proceed] is for her.”); Case No. ICC-01/13, Notice of
Appeal of “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation” (ICC-01/13-34), (July 27, 2015),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2024328.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2TX-FW4A]; Case No.
ICC-01/13, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation (July 16, 2015), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2015869.pdf.
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The effectiveness and unique selective justice concerns that accompany Council referrals arguably all militate in favor of consideration of declination.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the creation of both
the UN Security Council and the ICC, as well as the existing legal
frameworks for interaction. Part III elaborates on the possibility
that the Prosecutor might use her discretion to manage the ICC’s
relationship with the Council. Although the Prosecutor has few
tools at her disposal with which to affect the course of the Council’s
relationship with the ICC, she might use her “weapon of the weak,”
or soft power, to decline a future referral, coupled with an explanation of why the declination is in the interest of justice. This
Part also examines the counterarguments and limitations to
this possibility.
Part IV sets out a framework for conceptualizing effectiveness
and makes the case that Council referrals create unique effectiveness problems for the ICC because Council referrals affect many
States’ perceptions of the ICC’s independence. This Part also makes
the case that the ICC can be a more procedurally fair and effective
source and interpreter of ICL than the Council because of the ICC’s
normative specialization, its broad membership of and wide participation, and its institutional accountability and review mechanisms. 41 This distinctive accountability is evident in the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s capacity to legally review the Prosecutor’s decisions.42
Offering the opportunity for the institution to endorse or override
the Prosecutor’s judgment distinguishes the ICC from the Council.
The Council, by contrast, is held accountable only through politics.
Perceptions of fairness in the international community are far from
uniform, so what enhances the fairness of the ICC for some States
will not do so for all, but the pressing nature of the current critique
of the ICC’s “selective justice” requires a change in its future practice—including potentially declining a Council referral of a nonState Party to the Rome Statute. 43
41. See generally Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Accountability of International Prosecutors, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn
ed., 2015) (arguing that the ICC should use more than judicial intervention to address
prosecutorial misconduct).
42. The Council may request review of the Prosecutor’s decision under art. 53(3)(a),
and the PTC can initiate its own review of the Prosecutor’s decision. Rome Statute, supra
note 6, at art. 53(3)(b).
43. While it is theoretically possible that the Council could refer a State Party of the
ICC, it is more likely that the Prosecutor would initiate a prosecution. Also, while citizens
of the P3 might be haled before the ICC if they commit massive atrocities in States Parties’
territories, not until the Court opened an investigation in Georgia was this a practical possibility. This Article focuses on the relationship with the Council as one route to enhance
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Part V unpacks a select number of the negative and positive effects of the Prosecutor declining to pursue a Council referral and
some preliminary implications of this possibility. Declination would
have implications for theoretical debates in international relations
and international law scholarship. For example, authority in the
international sphere can increasingly be seen as being subject to
contestation among and between other international actors. 44 In an
unprecedented fashion, declination of Council referrals invites
scholars to consider how the most established international organizations and organs of the UN, such as the Council, today must
share authority and power with the more specialized international
organizations of the twenty-first century, such as the ICC.
As the adolescent ICC continues to grow, the Rome framework
may eventually be a corrective to the traditional understanding that
the UN Charter is the sole constitutional document of an international system. It may eventually no longer be that the UN Security
Council, with its power to bind Member States, sits unquestionably
at the apex of an international system. 45 Rather, international organizations may increasingly contest the authority of organs of international organizations as growing fragmentation creates the possibility for multiple seats of authority.
II. THE ICC AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
FOR INTERACTION
This Section provides background on the relationship between
the UN Security Council, the ICC, and their respective founding
documents. States’ political interests shaped the drafting of the UN
Charter and the Rome Statute, and the resulting legal frameworks
of each accordingly reflect the political power asymmetries of the
time. As the founding document of a twenty-first-century tribunal,
the Rome Statute enjoyed broad State and NGO participation and
support. By contrast, the UN Charter, establishing an international
the Court’s effectiveness. Relatedly, this Article maintains that ICC Prosecutors should
define as a priority or operative goal to successfully work with cooperating States Parties to
secure jurisdiction and evidence over the accused in mandate holding States. Note, however, that some scholars have argued that the Court’s authority is not affected by the source
of its different referrals. Leslie Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 278 (2016).
44. PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW
BEYOND BORDERS (2012) (offering a conceptualization of legal pluralism which “preserve[s]
spaces for productive interaction among multiple overlapping legal systems by developing
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to manage, without eliminating” difference amongst jurisprudences).
45. Member States are bound and obligated to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council acting under Chapter V, Article 25 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 25.
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system for the twentieth century, reflects the politics of that time.
These asymmetries are especially significant when the ICC receives
referrals from what is arguably the UN’s most powerful organ, the
Security Council. This interaction between the two bodies affects
the ICC’s current capacity to be perceived as an independent source
of international criminal law by States Parties.
Examining the processes leading to the establishment of both the
United Nations Security Council and the ICC helps us understand
one of the ICC’s challenges in supporting international criminal law
norms, namely, interacting with the Security Council and its three
non-States Parties permanent members. It also offers insight into
ways the Prosecutor might manage the relationship between the
ICC and the Council in the future, a subject that is developed in
Part III of this Article.

A. The Shaping of the UN Charter and the Rome Statute
International law is created through and shaped by a combination of States’ preferences, legal precedent, and also sometimes by
the advocacy of norm entrepreneurs. So, too, are international organizations. From among the fifty States that initially ratified the
UN Charter, the UN Security Council established the dominance of
the five, then so-called Great Powers, in matters of peace and security. 46 The process codified select pre-existing provisions of international law and created new laws. 47 Even as colonial powers lost
their grip on territories and the membership of the UN expanded,
the authority of the UN Security Council endured.
The text of the UN Charter still gives the Council unparalleled
power to bind Member States. 48 Over time, the Council has used its
Chapter VII powers to take action relating to threats to international peace and security, inter alia, to authorize peacemaking,
peacebuilding, and peacekeeping missions; establish ad hoc criminal tribunals; and to implement sanctions. The Council’s sanctions
have increasingly focused on individuals. In the early 1990s, when
the fifty-year old Council established ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Council also implicitly endorsed the view that
international criminal law is applicable to violations of international peace and security committed by individuals.

46. The original U.N. Charter from 1945 lists the fifty signatories that eventually
ratified the charter. See U.N. Charter (1945).
47. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, arts. 25, 75-85.
48. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).

274

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:261

When the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, it built on the
foundation established by the UN Security Council’s ad hoc tribunals. 49 While power disparities still influenced the content of the
Rome Statute, 50 an arguably nontrivial difference between these
negotiations and those of the UN Charter was that more than three
times the number of States involved in the UN Charter negotiations
of 1945—160 States—participated in these negotiations, as did numerous representatives of the United Nations and a vast network of
NGOs. 51 When the Rome Statute was ratified by 120 members in
2002, it ushered in an unprecedented model of international cooperation in international criminal law—one with global reach, but outside the absolute control of the permanent Council members.
Unlike the primarily State-focused model of the UN and its
Council organ, 52 the ICC’s twenty-first-century model of interna-

49. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May - 26 July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-First Session,
Supplement No.10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/

documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf&lang=EFSXP. The International Law Commission later generated a report, as did the General Assembly’s Preparatory Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See Rep. of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2
(Apr. 14, 1998).
50. For a critical and insightful analysis of the ways power disparities influence both
the jurisdiction and the optics of the Court, see Kamari Maxine Clarke, Opinion, Treat
Greed in Africa as a War Crime, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/30/opinion/treat-greed-in-africa-as-a-war-crime.html. See generally KAMARI
MAXINE CLARKE, FICTIONS OF JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
CHALLENGE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2009) (“documenting how human rights values are embedded in a new rule of law regime to produce a new language of
international justice”).
51. The 1998 Rome Conference was attended by more than 160 governments and 200
NGO’s. History of the ICC, Rome Conference, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=rome [https://perma.cc/YM6D-PVAX]. At the end of negotiations, “120 nations voted in favor of the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court,” with only 7 nations voting against the treaty, and 21 countries abstaining
from vote. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully analyze the scope and meaning
of these various stakeholders’ participation, but numerous scholars have reported on the
various impacts of participants’ contributions. See, e.g., William R. Pace & Mark Thieroff,
Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT – THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 391-98 (Roy
S. Lee ed., 1999); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 18 (4th ed. 2011); John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute
for the International Criminal Court and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11
PACE INT’L L. REV. 361, 368 (1999).
52. The UN is primarily State-focused, but its Charter also references human rights
norms. U.N. Charter pmbl. (“We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small . . . .”); U.N. Charter art.
1(3) (“The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . [t]o achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charter,
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tional organization exerts its power directly on individuals. The
preamble of the Rome Statute targets individuals, putting forward
a goal “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes” and
“to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice.” 53 The drafters of the Rome Statute devised an ambitious system of complementarity 54 capped by an unprecedented
permanent, autonomous and ostensibly apolitical ICC. In the preamble of the ICC, States Parties “[r]ecogniz[e] that such grave
crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.” 55
Although the ICC is technically autonomous, its mandate to end
impunity for international crimes overlaps significantly with the
UN Security Council’s mandate to maintain “international peace
and security.” 56

B. Negotiations About the Relationship Between the ICC and the
UN Security Council
The question of how, if at all, the ICC should interact with the
UN Security Council was a pivotal one during the formation and
the development of the ICC. The 1994 International Law Commission Draft Statute of the ICC initially recommended that the ICC
would solely receive cases by either referral from the UN Security
Council or self-referral by a State Party, except in cases of genocide. 57 Later, the “like-minded caucus” included more than 60 of
the 160 participating States in the UN Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome in June and July of 1998 (Rome Conference).
Its central concern was to ensure that the ICC had an independent
prosecutor and that the Security Council could not veto prosecutions, as well as that the ICC would have inherent jurisdiction

and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . . . .”).
53. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl. (“Determined to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes . . . .”).
54. Id. (“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this
Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”); id. at art. 1 (same); see
also id. at arts. 17, 18 (discussing States that are unable or unwilling to proceed in investigations or prosecutions and the effects on the Court’s jurisdiction).
55. Id. at pmbl.
56. See Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 28, at 431-32.
57. In cases of genocide, the Court would have “ ‘inherent’ jurisdiction.” Int’l L.
Comm’n, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court With Commentaries, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add/1, at 36-38, 41-42, 43-45 (1994).
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over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 58 Some
delegates in Rome noted that giving the Security Council power to
refer cases to the ICC would obviate the need for ad hoc tribunals. 59 They emphasized, however, that the ICC’s judgments must
be independent of political influence.
Indeed, when States came together in Rome in 1998 to create a
permanent international criminal tribunal, they also implicitly—
and some did so explicitly 60—rejected the Council’s politicallyinfluenced practice of establishing the ad hoc tribunals. They instead aimed to create a comprehensive system of international
criminal law and a permanent ICC, ostensibly outside of politics. 61
Broadly endorsing the project of international criminal law, the
160 States attending the Rome negotiations created an international court with broad, but not unlimited, jurisdiction. With many
powerful States such as China, the U.S., and Russia, refusing to
ratify, the prospects for universal jurisdiction were inherently limited. The system of international justice envisaged by the drafters
of the Rome Statute relies on the willingness of States Parties to
58. SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 19. Schabas notes that in 1997, the likeminded caucus
also succeeded in procuring the support of the United Kingdom. See id.
59. 2 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings
and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), at
76, ¶ 47 (June 15, 1998 - July 17, 1998) [hereinafter ICC Plenipotentiaries],
http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf (Brazil: “Brazil
believed it necessary to remove justification for the creation of new ad hoc tribunals by the
Council, which would require a provision such as article 10, paragraph 1, of the draft Statute. The Court should not, however, act as a subsidiary organ of the [Security] Council and
must aim for the highest level of judicial independence. Only in exceptional circumstances
should [the Court] be prevented by the Council from investigating or prosecuting cases
when the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, took a
formal decision to that effect. Even in such cases, however, the Court should not be prevented from exercising its jurisdiction for more than a limited period.”); see also id. at
67, ¶ 38 (United Kingdom and Northern Ireland: “The Security Council should be able to
refer to the Court situations in which crimes might have been committed, thus obviating
the need for further ad hoc tribunals. The Court’s procedures should be adapted from the
principal legal traditions to ensure fair and effective operation, safeguard the rights of the
accused and provide adequate protection and assistance to victims in giving evidence.”); id.
at 71, ¶ 104 (Observer for the International Law Commission: “Secondly, [The ICC] would
be created by treaty, under the control of the States parties to that treaty but in close relationship with the United Nations. It would therefore obviate the need for further ad hoc
tribunals.”); id. at 68, ¶ 55 (Sweden: “The Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, should indeed be able to refer to the Court situations in which
crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction appeared to have been committed but not punished.
That would obviate the need to create new ad hoc tribunals.”).
60. Id. at 69, ¶ 70-72 (Lesotho); id. at 94, ¶ 41-42 (Lebanon); id. at 292, ¶ 70 (Ecuador);
id. at 347, ¶ 44 (Cameroon); id. at 310, ¶ 82 (Yemen); id. at 196, ¶ 48 (Sri Lanka).
61. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully develop the ways in which States’
genuine aims, as opposed to their stated aims, have been both successful and unsuccessful.
But for excellent discussion of these issues, see generally CLARKE, supra note 50.
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comply with their obligations. It begins at the domestic level
through the principle of complementarity. Only if domestic systems are unwilling or unable to apply criminal law to crimes
against humanity, war crimes, genocide, or eventually, aggression,
does the ICC become involved. 62
During the Rome negotiations, the majority of States were concerned with how to best ensure the independence and impartiality
of this permanent tribunal. 63 States’ desire to avoid political influence on determinations of legal jurisdiction caused them to depart
from the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Statute recommendation that the Council be the only body to refer matters to
the ICC.
The resulting debates revolved around the issues of (1) the appropriate relationship between the Council and the ICC 64 and (2)
whether there should be an independent prosecutor. 65 Not surprisingly, three permanent Council members, the United States, 66
62. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl. (“[T]he International Criminal Court
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions . . . . ”); id. at art. 1 (“[The Court] shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.”); id. at art. 17(1)(a-b) (discussing that the case is inadmissible if it “is being
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” or “the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned”); id. at art. 18(2) (“[A] State may inform the
Court that it is investigating . . . the Prosecutor shall defer to the State’s investigation of
those persons.”); id. at art. 19(2)(b) (discussing that “[c]hallenges to . . . admissibility . . . may
be made by: . . . [a] State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted . . . . ”).
63. See ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59 (containing various States expressions of
their concerns about the independence and impartiality of the ICC).
64. Id. at 65, ¶ 21 (Norway: “Once a situation had been referred, it must be entirely
up to the Court to investigate and prosecute individuals on the basis of a truly independent
mandate.”); id. at 69, ¶ 72 (Lesotho: “The relationship between the Security Council and
the Court raised difficult questions. Although, in theory, no conflict should exist, the Council’s maintenance of peace and security might either complement or frustrate the work of
the Court in bringing war criminals to justice and advancing the international rule of law.
He opposed any political interference by the Council or States in the affairs of the Court.”).
65. For a critique of the resulting choices, see Greenawalt, supra note 23.
66. Young Sok Kim, The Preconditions to the Exercise of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: With Focus on Article 12 of the Rome Statute, 8 MICH. ST. J.
INT’L. L. & PRAC. 47, 71-72 (1999) (“The first proposal was on Article 7 (Preconditions to the
exercise of jurisdiction). This proposal required the consent of the territorial state and the
state of the nationality of the accused/suspect. As such, it required the consent of the state
of the nationality of the accused in every case if the Court wished to exercise its jurisdiction. The second proposal of the United States was on Article 7 ter (acceptance by nonStates Parties) and Article 7 bis (acceptance of jurisdiction). Article 7 ter, paragraph 1 of
this proposal showed the United States’ concern about the possible exposure of U.S. troops
serving in foreign countries to the courts [sic] jurisdiction even if the United States is not a
State Party to the Statute. The proposal on ‘possible protocol for opt-in’ permitted a State
Party to ‘opt-out’ of crimes against humanity or war crimes or both. Moreover, it provided
that the protocol should remain in force thereafter for a period of 10 years and might be
prolonged. With regard to the United States’ amendments, Norway, on behalf of the Like-
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France, and the United Kingdom, emphasized that there was a
necessary relationship between the Council and the ICC. Many
States argued that although the Council could refer situations, the
Prosecutor’s independence must be respected and maintained, 67
and some States objected to the possibility that the Council could
defer or suspend matters. During the Rome negotiations, delegates
from Africa—a region with no permanent representation on the
Council—frequently noted that the political Council should not
have a relationship with this independent, apolitical ICC. 68 Indeed, many States were opposed to the Council having any power
to defer or suspend ICC matters for a year. Still, the Rome Statute
eventually, or for realists, perhaps inevitably, 69 granted this power
to the Council. 70 Regarding the independent prosecutor, the sixtyMinded Group, put forward a no-action motion. The voting result on the no action motion
was 113-17, with 25 abstentions. Thus, the amendments of the United States were rejected
by the overwhelming majority.” (footnotes omitted)).
67. See generally ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59 (see, e.g., statements by South
Africa and Norway).
68. Id. at 65, ¶ 15 (Lesotho: “The relationship between the Security Council and the
Court raised difficult questions. Although, in theory, no conflict should exist, the Council’s
maintenance of peace and security might either complement or frustrate the work of the
Court in bringing war criminals to justice and advancing the international rule of law.”);
id. at 69, ¶ 76 (Egypt: “The International Criminal Court should be independent and
should not be influenced by political considerations, and precise limits must be set in its
relationship with the Security Council. The role of the Council in referring matters to the
Court must be clearly defined, but it was for the Court to decide whether to commence
prosecution proceedings or not.”); id. at 77, ¶ 67 (Kenya: “The relationship between the
Security Council and the Court needed to be clarified to ensure that the independence and
legitimacy of the Court were not undermined. A suitable mechanism for financing the
Court had to be set up in order to preserve its independence.”).
69. Since the Council has the power to establish ad hoc tribunals as it has already
done, it is perhaps not surprising that States opted to permit the Council to send situations
to the Court. Yet, as noted above, diplomats and politicians argue that ad hoc tribunals will
be required to fill gaps in the Rome framework. See Mary Fan, Custom, General Principles
and the Great Architect Cassese, 10 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUST. 1063, 1070 (2012); Pamela J.
Stephens, Collective Criminality and Individual Responsibility: The Constraints of Interpretation, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 501, 537 (2014).
70. See, e.g., ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at 122, ¶ 23 (Philippines: “Finally,
the Security Council could seek deferral of prosecution for a one-year period, renewable for
an apparently unlimited number of times.”); id. at 210, ¶93 (Italy: “The issue of the Security Council’s power to block intervention by the Court was a delicate one, and it was important to provide guarantees that the Court’s action would not be indefinitely impeded or
gravely prejudiced. Any request for deferral of an investigation should be made only following a formal decision by the Council, and be confined to a specific period of time, with limited possibility of renewal.”); id. at 298, ¶ 63 (Sierra Leone: “[The] delegation would prefer
option 2 for article 10, paragraph 2, if the deferral period was shorter, namely, 6 months
rather than 12. . . . His delegation considered that the deferral request should be renewable
only twice if it was for a duration of 6 months, or once if it remained at 12.”); id. at
299, ¶ 73 (Azerbaijan: “As far as deferral was concerned, option 1 for article 10, paragraph
2, was not appropriately formulated. A 12-month period seemed too long. Moreover, his
delegation did not favour renewal of the request by the Security Council.”); id. at
301, ¶ 115 (Russian Federation: “With regard to deferral, his delegation found it difficult to
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three States that lobbied for an independent prosecutor initially
did not include any Security Council members, but eventually
the United Kingdom joined this group. France ultimately
ratified the Rome Statute, thereby accepting the Prosecutor’s
proprio motu powers. 71

C. The Resulting Framework
The Rome Statute anticipates a cooperative relationship between the Council and the ICC while still asserting the ICC’s
independence. 72 As the tables indicate, the Statute provides
a number of ways the ICC may interact with the Council. 73

agree with any wording that might be interpreted as modifying the obligations of States
under the Charter of the United Nations, in particular under Chapter VII. Moreover, the
introduction of any time limit might be interpreted as affecting the Council’s powers under
Chapter VII. His delegation was prepared to seek a generally acceptable option.”).
71. See SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 15-16, n.54.
72. Numerous Rome Statute provisions aim to protect the independence of the Prosecutor and the Judiciary. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 36, ¶ 2 (discussing proposals
for increases of the number of judges; the Presidency may propose an increase, such proposal is then considered and subsequently adopted if approved by a two-thirds vote of the
members of the Assembly of States Parties); id. at art. 40, ¶ 1 (“The judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions.”); id. at art. 42, ¶¶ 1, 4 (“The Office of the
Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court.” Also noting the responsibilities and election process of the Prosecutor by secret ballot by an absolute majority
of the Assembly of States Parties); id. at art. 48, ¶¶ 1-2 (The Court enjoys privileges and
immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes in each State Party, as well as the
judges, Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors, and Registrar.); id. at art. 36 (describing the
“[q]ualifications, nomination and election of judges”); id. at art. 40 (describing the professional and independent nature of judges on the ICC); id. at art. 42 (describing the roles, responsibilities, and independent nature of the ICC Prosecutor); id. at art. 48 (describing the
privileges and immunities of the judges, Prosecutor, and registrar within the “territory of
each State Party”).
73. See infra Tables 1 and 2.
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First, the Council may refer situations—even those of non-States
Parties to the Rome Statute, such as in the Sudan and Libya—to the
Court. 74 In fact, the only other way a situation can come before the
ICC is through ex ante State consent—either when the State in question is the territory where the alleged crime occurred, or it is the
State of nationality of the accused. 75 Second, the Council also may
defer proceedings of the ICC for periods of up to a year. 76 This provision anticipates the potential conflict between peace and justice, and
permits the Council to focus on peace, at least temporarily, over ICC
proceedings. Third, the Security Council can request the Pre-Trial
Chamber to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate or to
prosecute. 77 Fourth, in the amended Rome Statute (“Statute”), effective after January 2017, in order for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression in a proprio motu or State-referred case,
the Prosecutor must inform the Council.78 Should the Council refer a
74. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 13(b) (“A situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations . . . .”). The Court
would not have had jurisdiction over cases in Sudan and Libya were it not for the UN Security Council’s referrals pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. This Article argues
that it is more likely that the Council will refer a situation in a non-State party to the
Court than one of a State Party. This is because States can self-refer and the Prosecutor
can initiate investigations in her jurisdiction. In addition, the threshold for agreement of
Security Council members is high—see failed attempts to refer the situation in Syria to the
Court. Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court
Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N.
Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/CZ7V-34XV].
75. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 12, ¶ 2 (a) (requiring as a “[p]recondition[] to
the exercise of [the Court’s] jurisdiction,” that “[t]he State [be] the territory of which the
conduct in question occurred”); id. at art. 13 (A State may accept the jurisdiction of the
Court with respect to the crime in question and shall cooperate without delay). It should be
noted that referrals by States Parties mandate holders are not always immune from critique. See, e.g., Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda refers situation concerning the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, ICC-20040129-44 (Jan. 29, 2004).
76. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 16 (“No investigation or prosecution may be
commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council
under the same conditions.”).
77. Id. at art. 53, ¶ 3 (a) (“At the request of the State making a referral under article
14 or the Security Council under article 13, paragraph (b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may
review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not to proceed and may request
the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.”).
78. Id. at art. 15 (The Prosecutor must inform the UN Security Council about the
possible act of aggression, whether after State self-referral or a proprio motu determination. The UN Security Council then has six months to determine that an act of aggression
has occurred. If the Security Council does not make a determination within the allotted
time, the Prosecutor may only proceed if the Pre-Trial Chamber so authorizes. The Court
has its own authority to determine whether an act of aggression has occurred.). For an
Article providing the United States’ perspective on the current definition of aggression,
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situation to the ICC, the ICC will not be prejudiced by the Council’s
finding of aggression. 79 Finally, Article 87(7) of the Statute provides,
that when the Council has referred a situation to the ICC, the ICC
may report to the Council any State that fails to cooperate with subsequent proceedings.80 Neither the Charter nor the Rome Statute
provides the ICC the legal authority to compel action from the Council. In addition, since its founding, the ICC has entered into a Relationship Agreement with the UN to help facilitate cooperation, but
this Agreement creates procedures for transmitting information between the ICC and the Security Council without at the same time
creating unfailing substantive obligations on the Council.81
In short, the negotiation processes and treaties leading to the establishment of these organizations laid the foundations for a complex
relationship between the ICC and Council, one that allows for possible conflict between peace and justice goals. The first two Prosecutors
have each made choices as they have navigated these developments,
trying to shape this relationship to be effective for the ICC in various
ways. 82 The time is now ripe for the Prosecutor to consider declining
a future UN Security Council referral.

D. The Predictable and the Unexpected
The Council’s first referral to the ICC in 2005 was widely seen as
a positive development for the ICC, particularly since three of the
Council’s five permanent, veto-wielding members—the United
arguing that the Court should have a limited role in prosecuting the crime on the basis
that “the highly controversial aggression amendments could enter into force on the same
basis as the streamlined entry-into-force provisions for amendments ‘which are of an exclusively institutional nature,’ ” see Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of
Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 289 (2015) (arguing
that there are potentially negative effects of the aggression amendments that might easily
be put into practice and are often highly politicized).
79. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 15, ¶ 4.
80. Id. at art. 87, ¶ 7 (“Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate
by the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from
exercising its functions and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to
that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security
Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.”).
81. Int’l Criminal Court, Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, at 8 (Sept.
7, 2004). Article 17 pertains to “Cooperation between the Security Council of the United
Nations and the Court” and Article 17(1) indicates that in case of a Council referral, the
Secretary General shall transmit information from the Court to the Security Council “in
accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” Article 17(3) says
that when the Court finds non-cooperation under Article 87(7), “The Security Council,
through the Secretary General, shall inform the Court through the Registrar of action, if
any, taken by it under the circumstances.”
82. See generally True-Frost, International Civil Servant, supra note 31.
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States, Russia, and China—are not States Parties to the Statute, and
had been hostile in various ways towards the ICC. The first two referrals to the ICC arguably served to enhance the ICC’s stature in
the realm of power and international law and politics. 83 The positive
value of the Council’s recognition of the ICC through its referrals of
situations in Sudan and Libya, 84 however, has been counterbalanced
by the Council’s many omissions in supporting the Court. 85 In light of
83. Many States Parties viewed the Council’s first referral as an endorsement of the
Court’s mandate. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in
Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351
(Mar. 31, 2015) (Denmark: “[Denmark’s Representative] was encouraged that the Council
had voted to adopt a resolution to bring an internationally recognized follow-up to the
crimes in Darfur.” Argentina: “[This] resolution gave strong support to the Court and
demonstrated significant progress within the United Nations to ensure the functioning of
an international system for human rights, for which the Court was an essential tool.”
France: “[France’s Representative] was gratified by the adoption of this historic resolution,
by which the Council, for the first time, referred a situation to the ICC.” Greece: “The text
strengthened the Council’s authority, as well as that of the International Criminal Court,
which would have the possibility of showing its competence.”). Christian Wenaweser (ASP
President), in a speech to ICC members in December of 2011, stated, “We as States Parties
will have to think about the relationship between the Security Council and the
Court. . . . We have had two referrals of situations by the Council, one of them by consensus. This was essential in giving the Court the place it currently has. In the future, we thus
no longer have to look at referrals from the point of view of acceptance of the Court—we
have achieved that acceptance—but rather from the best interest of international criminal
justice. This means in concrete terms a genuine commitment to ensure that justice is done,
by providing the necessary diplomatic and financial support.” DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH
JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS 172 (2014).
84. The Security Council referred to the Court situations in the non-State Parties
Sudan in 2005, and in Libya in 2011. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4, 8 (Feb. 26, 2011) (recognizing
that the UN shall bear no costs of the referral) (referring situation in Libya to the ICC);
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶¶ 1, 7 (Mar. 31, 2005) (recognizing that the UN shall bear no costs of the
referral) (referring situation in Sudan to the ICC). These two African States are not States
Parties to the Rome Statute and have not directly consented to be subject to the
Court’s jurisdiction.
85. Of the thirteen 87(7) non-cooperation findings the Court has transmitted to the
Council as of April 2016, the Council has failed to respond to all of them. Prosecutor v.
Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Finding of
Non-Compliance (Nov. 19, 2015); Prosecutor v. Hussein, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/12, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for a finding of non-compliance against the Republic of the
Sudan (June 26, 2015); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan
(Mar. 9, 2015); Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the noncompliance by Libya with requests for cooperation by the Court and referring the matter to
the United Nations Security Council (Dec. 10, 2014); Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under
Article 87(7) of the Statute (Dec. 3, 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/0501/09, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding
Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court (Apr. 9, 2014); Prosecutor v. Al
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Non-Compliance of the Republic of Chad
with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Mar. 26, 2013); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC02/05-01/09, Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the
Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect
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the Council’s failure to support its referrals to the ICC fully, eleven
years later, it is far from clear that, on balance, the referrals have
enhanced the effectiveness 86 of the ICC or perceptions of its fairness.
The Council has clearly refused to support the ICC by, for example,
refusing to fund its referrals and restricting funding from the General Assembly to the ICC. 87 It has also failed to sanction ICC indictees in situations it referred. It has neither established a committee to
coordinate support for the ICC’s proceedings, nor taken action when

to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor
v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Article
87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/0501/09, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the
States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to Djibouti (May
12, 2011); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute
about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to the Republic of Chad (Aug. 27, 2010); Prosecutor v.
Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision informing the United Nations Security
Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar AlBashir’s presence in the territory of the Republic of Kenya (Aug. 27, 2010); Prosecutor v.
Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council
about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of Sudan (May 25, 2010); Int’l Criminal
Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc.
ICC-ASP/13/40 (Dec. 5, 2014); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of
the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/12/34 (Nov. 7, 2013); Int’l Criminal
Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc.
ICC-ASP/11/29 (Nov. 1, 2012).
In addition, the Council once demonstrated limited support of the ICC’s efforts in ending impunity in Darfur by responding to one of the Prosecutor’s requests for support by
issuing a presidential statement. In 2008, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo asked the Security
Council to “send today a strong and unanimous message to the Government of the Sudan,
requesting compliance with Resolution 1593 . . . .” Luis Moreno Ocampo, Statement to the
United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 8 (Dec. 5, 2007),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1ADB9ADC-D65B-441A-863D-1139C5E42ED7/277794/
OTPST20071205UNSCLMOENG.pdf. In response, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement of the Security Council stating, “In this respect, the Council urges the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with the
Court, consistent with resolution 1593 (2005), in order to put an end to impunity for the
crimes committed in Darfur.” Statement by the President of the Security Council, United
Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST 2008/21 (June 16, 2008), http://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2008/21; U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5905th mtg.
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5905, at 5 (June 5, 2008).
86. For a definition of effectiveness, see Shany, supra note 13, at 230.
87. Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1593 states “none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations . . . such costs shall be
borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute
voluntarily . . . .” S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005); Letter Dated 19 May, 2014 from the
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/68/884-S/2014/361 (May 21, 2014), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_361.pdf.
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the ICC has reported noncompliance by States Parties to the Council.88
Council members China, Malawi, and Nigeria, have even actively undermined the ICC by hosting indictee Omar Al-Bashir for visits.89
As of November 2016, the ICC had conducted twenty-three public
preliminary examinations—ten of which were ongoing 90—initiated
ten investigations, 91 and issued thirty-nine arrest warrants or summons to appear in twenty-three cases.92 Of the ten situations that
have come before the ICC, six were referred by States Parties, two
were initiated by the Prosecutor, and two were referred by the Security Council. 93 The ICC has had custody over eleven defendants. Of
88. It is interesting to note, but beyond the scope of this Article to investigate further,
that the Council also has not sought compliance by States with judgments from the International Court of Justice. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, THE RULE OF LAW: CAN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL MAKE BETTER USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE?, (2016),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/the-rule-of-law-can-thesecurity-council-make-better-use-of-the-international-court-of-justice.php.
89. International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on
non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/12/34 (Nov. 7, 2013) (reporting that Mr. Al-Bashir
visited Nigeria in 2013); International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of
the Bureau on non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/11/29 (Nov. 1, 2012) (reporting that
Pre-Trial Chamber I rendered decision pursuant to 87(7) of the Rome State that Malawi
had failed to cooperate with the Court’s request for the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir).
90. See, e.g., Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary
Examination Activities 2016 (Nov. 14, 2016); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015 (Nov. 12, 2015); Int’l Criminal
Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014 (Dec. 2,
2014); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013 (Nov. 11, 2013); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Report
on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012 (Nov. 11, 2012); Int’l Criminal Court, Office of
the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011 (Dec. 13, 2011).
91. Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icccpi.int/pages/situations.aspx [https://perma.cc/2SN2-QWSJ].
92. Leslie Vinjamuri, The Distant Promise of a Negotiated Justice, 146 DAEDALUS
100, 101 (2017).
93. See supra text accompanying note 82. See generally Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC01/12-01/15, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi,
(Mar.
24,
2016)
(referred
by
State
Party
Mali),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02424.PDF [https://perma.cc/JWF9-PVH3]; Prosecutor v.
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 8 (referred by State Party Central African Republic) (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y34C-C8E8]; Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15, Investigation (Jan. 27, 2016) (referred by Prosecutor), https://www.icccpi.int/georgia [https://perma.cc/2VG5-S2RN]; Situation with Central African Republic II,
ICC-01/14, Investigation (Sept. 2014) (referred by State Party Central African Republic),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/carII [https://perma.cc/46D3-UJZH]; Registered Vessels of Comoros,
Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13, Preliminary Examination (May 14, 2013) (referred by
State Party Union of the Comoros), https://www.icc-cpi.int/comoros [https://perma.cc/V87XNHFS]; Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute, ¶ 9 (referred by State Party Democratic Republic of Congo) (Mar. 14, 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b)
of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 1, 22 (referred by Prosecutor) (Jan. 23, 2012), https://www.icc-
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the current cases, ten are in the pretrial stage, four are in the trial
stage, and no appeals are pending before the Appeals Court.94 Seven
cases are either closed or complete. 95
Over the course of its operations, the ICC’s relationship with the
UN Security Council has combined elements of the predictable and
the unexpected. The relationship is arguably not what most States
Parties expected it would be when the Rome Statute was drafted. For
example, the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations
and the ICC and Rome Statute Articles 115 and 87(7) demonstrate
an expectation that the United Nations would help fund investigations in situations the Council referred, but the Council has forbidden such support. 96
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01006.PDF [https://perma.cc/7VX8-TWSU]; Situation in
Libya, ICC-01/11, Investigation (Mar. 2011) (referred by UN Security Council),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya; Prosecutor v. Kony, ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute, ¶¶ 1, 37 (referred by State Party Uganda) (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01678.PDF; Prosecutor v.
Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 1, 40 (referred by UN Security Council) (Mar. 4,
2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF.
94. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/13, Opening of the trial (Sept. 29,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/car/Bemba-et-al/Documents/Bemba-et-alEng.pdf; Prosecutor
v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Opening of the trial (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.icccpi.int/drc/ntaganda/Documents/NtagandaEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/15,
Decision on the Confirmation of charges (June 12, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi/gbagbogoude/Documents/Gbagbo-and-BleGoudeEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Barasa, ICC-01/09-01/13,
Warrant of Arrest (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/barasa; Prosecutor v. Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 1, 2012); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010), https://www.icccpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2T9-8CUN]; Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 27, 2007), https://www.icccpi.int/darfur/harunkushayb/Documents/HarunKushaybEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK9U-EZHM].
95. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Case Terminated (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/rutosang/Documents/RutoSangEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11, Charges Withdrawn (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/kenya/kenyatta/Documents/KenyattaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC5B-KGQ4]; Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Conviction and Sentence (May 23, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/katanga/Documents/KatangaEng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LGZ-NKQZ];
Prosecutor v. Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12, Acquitted and Released (Dec. 21, 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ngudjolo/Documents/ChuiEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/X44E-4XL4];
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Verdict and Sentence (July 10, 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga/Documents/LubangaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MCS-2RWL];
Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Released (Dec. 23, 2011), https://www.icccpi.int/drc/mbarushimana/Documents/MbarushimanaEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Garda, ICC02/05-02/09, Confirmation of Charges Declined (Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.icccpi.int/darfur/abugarda/Documents/AbuGardaEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L6U-FKFH].
96. Int’l Criminal Court, Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations supra note 81, at art. 13, ¶ 2 ICC (“The
United Nations and the Court further agree that the costs and expenses resulting from
cooperation or the provision of services pursuant to the present Agreement shall be subject
to separate arrangements between the United Nations and the Court. The Registrar shall
inform the Assembly of the making of such arrangements.”).
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That the relationship between the Council and the ICC would be
challenging was predictable. The choice of three permanent, vetowielding members of the Council, the United States, China and Russia, not to join the ICC did not foreshadow an uncomplicated relationship.97 These three permanent members’ failure to commit to the
ICC certainly contributes to the Council’s inconsistent referral practice. Indeed, given the resistance to the ICC of three of the Council’s
permanent members, its initial failure to refer any situations to the
ICC might well have remained the status quo.
The United States’ legal inability to fund the ICC has also created
obstacles in the relationship.98 Unprecedented developments in the
relationship included the United States’ so-called Article 98 agreements between it and Rome Statute Member States, intending to defeat the ability of the ICC to secure jurisdiction over American citizens.99 Indeed, as a practical matter, in the early days of the Court, it
was far from clear that the Council would ever be able to refer to the
ICC in its work relating to international peace and security. Rather,
the Council’s very first resolutions concerning the ICC were hostile,
purporting to defer ICC authority over peacekeepers. 100
But in 2005, the Council referred the situation in the Sudan to the
ICC, with restrictions, and in 2011, it sent the situation in Libya to
the ICC. Notwithstanding the emphasis of delegates at the Rome
Conference on the need for solid funding and cooperation for the success of the ICC, in both of its referrals, the Security Council purports
to prohibit the General Assembly from offering financial support to
the ICC, even for expenses relating to the Council’s referrals. 101 Alt97. The United States and China expressed their opposition to the Court during the
vote on the Rome Statute’s adoption. ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at ¶¶ 28, 33, 40
(cited in SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 21).
98. Colonel M. Tia Johnson, The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act: Protecting Whom?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 408 n.14 (2003) (“[T]he American Servicemember and
Civilian Protection Act of 2002 . . . . prohibits United States government funds in support
of the [International Criminal] Court.”).
99. Judith Kelley, Op-Ed., Big-Stick Diplomacy Ill-Serves Our Cause, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 4, 2004, at A23; William A. Schabas, The International Criminal
Court and Non-Party States, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 1, 20 (2010) (“In late November 2006, President Bush waived the penalties imposed upon countries that refused to
reach bilateral surrender agreements . . . .”).
100. See S.C. Res. 1497, ¶ 7 (Aug. 1, 2003); S.C. Res. 1487, ¶ 1 (June, 12, 2003); S.C.
Res. 1422 (July 12, 2002); see also Neha Jain, A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash
Between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
239, 240 (2005) (discussing Security Council Resolutions that erode the power of the ICC
by excluding its jurisdiction).
101. Compare S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 8 (Feb. 26, 2011) (recognizing that the UN shall bear
no costs of the referral and referring situation in Libya to the ICC), and S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7
(Mar. 31, 2005) (recognizing that the UN shall bear no costs of the referral), with Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 115 (anticipating receipt of funding from the General Assembly for

2016]

WEAPONS OF THE WEAK

289

hough the provisions of the Rome Statute anticipated the Council’s
support for the ICC’s work in referred matters, politics have affected
the Council’s capacity to provide support for its referrals. Indeed, the
restrictions on funding are largely due to American domestic opposition to the ICC in the form of the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA).102 The record and resulting documents of the Rome
Conference show that a few delegates there contemplated the Council
would prohibit UN-funding as a condition of its referrals. 103
In addition, for those who hoped that the Council’s referrals would
presage its support for the ICC, the Council’s failures to act are particularly disappointing. After the Council’s two referrals, the Council’s continuing failure to refer to the ICC the situation in Syria,104
where massive crimes are plainly occurring, has exacerbated perceptions of selective justice.105 The failure highlights the determinative
role of politics in Council referrals. Council members failed to help
enforce the ICC’s warrants, even in those cases resulting from situations the Council had referred to the ICC.
That permanent Council members, such as China and elected
members Chad and Nigeria, would host President Omar Al-Bashir,
whom the ICC indicted pursuant to a Council referral, was, for many
“expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council”). For support for the claim that
the UN Security Council violates international law when it prevents the General Assembly
from funding Council’s referrals, see, for example, Luigi Condorelli & Annalisa Ciampi,
Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC, 3 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 590, 594 (2005) (arguing that the SC’s forbidding funding in connection with the
Darfur case is “at odds not only with [its] decision to refer, but also with the duty of good faith
negotiations . . . .”); Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 28, at 430 (arguing that the SC’s referral of
the Darfur case violated the “funding scheme” and “the spirit” of art. 115(b) of the Rome Statute); Isanga, supra note 5; W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, On Paying the Piper:
Financial Responsibility for Security Council Referrals to the International Criminal Court,
99 AM. J. INT’L. L. 615, 616 (2005) (quoting Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, who has written that
“the general sentiment among the delegations was that if the Security Council refers a matter
to the Court, the United Nations should pay the expenses”).
In the travaux preparatoire, there was a lack of clarity about the funding of the Court.
For example, at the meeting held in Cartagena de Indais, members of the Movement of
Non-Aligned Countries stressed a need for a “suitable method of funding . . . to ensure respect for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.” ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at
73, ¶ 16. However, the Overseer for the International Court of Jurists felt that the Court
should be funded from the U.N. regular budget. Id. at 89-90, ¶ 76. Meanwhile, the United
States suggested that the Court should be funded by the States Parties to the Rome Statute. Id. at 246, ¶ 47.
102. See American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-33 (2012).
103. See id.; ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59.
104. U.N. Security Council, Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_348.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW5F-VEP5].
105. Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court
Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N.
Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 2014).
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States Parties, not expected. 106 The Council has not entered sanctions
against those who have been indicted by the ICC following its referrals. Indeed, as of March 2016, no ICC defendant has been sanctioned by the UN Security Council after being indicted by the ICC. 107
It also failed to issue country-specific resolutions or to sanction
individuals in States that have violated their international law obligations by failing to arrest ICC indictees in Council-referred situations. 108 Yet, leaders in violating States are arguably breaking not
just the terms of the Rome Statute but also Article 25 of the UN
Charter.109 In June 2015, South Africa joined the list of African
106. Lucas Buzzard, Comment, Holding an Arsonist’s Feet to the Fire? – The Legality
and Enforceability of the ICC’s Arrest Warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, 24

AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 897, 918 n.102 (2009) (citing Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando,
Referral and Deferral by the Security Council, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 619, 627, 634 (Antonio Cassesse et al.
eds., 2002) (noting that the Security Council’s actions are binding in nature under Chapter
VII); Mohammed Amin, Defiant ICC Indictee Omar Hassan al-Bashir Flies to China, DAILY
NATION (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Defiant-ICC-indictee-Omar-Hassanal-Bashir-flies-to-China/-/1066/2853142/-/13y0n1o/-/index.html
[https://perma.cc/MLG6-GE7X]
(noting that Omar Hassan al-Bashir also visited China in 2011); Omar Al-Bashir and the UN
General Assembly: An Awkward Guest to Invite, DARFUR WOMEN ACTION GROUP (Aug. 21,
2015), http://www.darfurwomenaction.org/omar-al-bashir-and-the-un-general-assembly-anawkward-guest-to-invite/ [https://perma.cc/QMP7-B5E8] (noting that Al-Bashir also
threatened to attend the 2013 General Assembly only to later scrap his plans). Scholars
who closely followed China’s role in and response to the international community’s reaction
to events in the Sudan, however, might have expected China’s flouting of the Court’s authority in the matter. See generally e.g., REBECCA HAMILTON, FIGHTING FOR DARFUR:
PUBLIC ACTION AND THE STRUGGLE TO STOP GENOCIDE (2011).
107. See supra Table 1. “The Council’s Rome Statute Powers Vis-à-vis the ICC.” Of
those Council-referred matters: The UN Security Council has sanctioned zero of seven
indictees in the situation in the Sudan. The UN Security Council sanctioned three of three
indictees in the situation in Libya before the ICC indicted them. Of State-referred matters:
Six ICC defendants from Congo were listed by the Security Council before being indicted.
There is some overlap between the list of indictees and those on the Council’s targeted
sanctions lists, but that overlap has occurred only when the ICC acted after the Council.
The Council has not followed the Court’s lead and sanctioned individuals indicted by the
Court. It is beyond the scope of this Article to argue whether such a practice would be advisable or not. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that that while the Council sanctioning indictees might raise new issues regarding the independence of the Court
and the Council, it is nevertheless one tool the Council could use to support the Court.
108. International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on
non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/15/31 (Nov. 8, 2016).
109. Under Article 25 of the Charter, Members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
defend the notion that States that violate the implications of Security Council referrals are
violating Article 25 of the UN Charter. For support of this argument, see, for example,
Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on
Al Bashir’s Immunities, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333, 341 (2009) (“[S]ince the jurisdiction and
functioning of the Court must take place in accordance with the [Rome] Statute, a decision
to confer jurisdiction is a decision to confer it in accordance with the Statute. Thus, all
states (including non-parties) are bound to accept that the Court can act in accordance with
its Statute [in the case of Council referrals]. In this sense, at least, a non-party to the Statute is bound by the Statute in the case of a [Council] referral—in the sense that it is bound
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States flouting the authority of the ICC by inviting Al-Bashir to visit
during the African Union Summit. Nonetheless, the Council did not
pass a resolution regarding South Africa’s illegal actions, although
ten Council members at the time were States Parties of the Rome
Statute. 110 Not long after South Africa’s highest court ruled, in March
2016, that the government violated its international law obligations
by failing to arrest Al-Bashir during a visit, 111 the South African government announced its withdrawal from the ICC. 112
In addition, although the ICC has reported to the Council instances of State noncompliance in Council-referred cases, as anticipated by
the Rome Statute in Article 87(7), to date, the Council has not responded to these reports.113 Over six years after the ICC’s issuance of
two arrest warrants for the President of the Sudan on March 4, 2009,
and July 12, 2010, the UN Security Council has still not taken action
against non-compliant States. 114 Council members fully understand
to accept the jurisdiction of the Court and legality of the Court’s operation in accordance
with its Statute.”); Phakiso Mochochoko, Open Debate of the United Nations Security
Council on “Peace and Justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Criminal Court,” address on behalf of the Prosecutor, at 3 (Oct. 17, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/otp/ENGPMatUNSC_17102012.pdf [https://perma.cc/A39K-69W5] (“Once the
Security Council decides to refer a situation to the Prosecutor, the judicial process has been
triggered and the matter is fully in the hands of the Prosecutor and the Judges. The only
way to stop the procedure is one of legal means, by invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute.
Efforts to interfere with the independent exercise of the Office’s mandate would only serve
to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the judicial process, thus giving credence to
allegations of politicization.”).
110. These States were: Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. See Countries Elected Members of the Security Council, U NITED N ATIONS S ECURITY C OUNCIL,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp [https://perma.cc/R2UQ-9T3L].
111. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. The Southern African
Litigation Centre 2016 (1) SA 1 (SCA) at 74, ¶ 113 (S. Afr.); see Norimitsu Onishi, Omar alBashir, Leaving South Africa, Eludes Arrest Again, N.Y TIMES (June 15, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/omar-hassan-al-bashir-sudan-south-africa.html?_r=0.
112. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, South Africa: Withdrawal,
C.N.786.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 19, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf.
113. On March 9, 2015, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued a decision of noncompliance finding that Syria failed to cooperate with the Court when it failed to arrest
and surrender the Sudanese President, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, which it submitted to the Council on March 20, 2015. The Court referred the matter to the Council to take
“appropriate measures.” Bashir has visited six State Parties without being arrested: Chad,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria, and was invited to
attend the AU summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in June 2015. June 2015 Monthly
Forecast, SECURITY COUNCIL REP. (June 1, 2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
monthly-forecast/2015-06/sudan_darfur_16.php; see International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Rep. of the Bureau on non-cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/15/31
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP-15-31-ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UWW-CG5N].
114. See Prosecutor v. Harun, ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision informing the United Nations
Security Council about the lack of cooperation by the Republic of Sudan (May 25, 2015),
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that the ICC does not have the independent ability to investigate situations successfully and to secure custody of its indictees without
support from States or the Council.
In short, in many respects, the Council has not acted cooperatively
with the ICC; for example, it failed to send strong signals of support to
States Parties and UN Member States that they must comply with its
decisions. The Council has significant discretion in navigating its relationships with the ICC, the Prosecutor has far less. What might happen, then, if the ICC Prosecutor exercised her relatively limited discretion differently to manage this otherwise challenging relationship?
III. A WEAPON OF THE (RELATIVELY) WEAK: PROSECUTORIAL
DECLINATION
Within the ICC, the Prosecutor has administrative power and discretion regarding numerous issues, including the place and timing of
preliminary examinations, investigations, and whom to prosecute.115
Within the limits provided by the legal framework, she can use her
soft power and discretion to guide the relationship between the ICC
and the Council. Even in the face of many obstacles the Council has
created that impinge upon the ICC’s successes, there are possibilities
for improving the effectiveness of the relationship. Two provisions of
the Rome Statute allow the Prosecutor to use her discretion to determine the admissibility of a case: the provision regarding gravity
and the provision regarding the interests of justice. The Prosecutor
otherwise has little leverage in dealing with non-State Parties to the
Rome Statute. Her biggest sources of leverage are: (1) a supportive
Security Council, (2) supportive Rome Statute States Parties, and (3)
her soft power to influence States and IOs.
Although the literature on the overlap between international
criminal law and politics is extensive, 116 and much of it focuses on
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc868180.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WS4-4NDB]; S.C. Res.
2147 (Mar. 28, 2014); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/13/40 (Dec. 5, 2014); Int’l Criminal Court,
Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICCASP/12/34 (Nov. 7, 2013); Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the
Bureau on Non-Cooperation, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/11/29 (Nov. 1, 2012); International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Assembly Procedures Relating to non-cooperation,
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/10/Res.5, annex.
115. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 13, 15. Indeed, declining to investigate is
not the only route the Prosecutor might use to control Court resources. She might prosecute only the lowest ranking individuals.
116. See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2007) (discussing how international criminals who perpetrate crimes of atrocity should be
punished differently from traditional, western-based political concepts of punishment);
Tom Ginsburg, The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court, 9 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 499 (2009) (discussing the “clash of commitments” in the ICC and the Court’s in-
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prosecutorial discretion, few scholars writing about prosecutorial discretion have focused on the question of how the Prosecutor could use
her discretion to more effectively manage this critical relationship
between the ICC and the Council. 117 Often scholars have made recommendations hoping to shame or coax support out of the Council,
but too often the Council has remained impervious to outside suggestions of reform.118 A number of scholars have also considered how the
Prosecutor might use her discretion to help the ICC to better achieve
its mandate, including, for example, Rebecca Hamilton’s recent article proposing that the Prosecutor might plan to exit some ongoing
situations. 119 A gap in the existing literature 120 is therefore filled by
terest in going forward with prosecutions without regard to political considerations); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the
International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 134 (2009) (discussing issues with the
ICC’s conflict with political interference and issues with legitimization); Jack
Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 20 (2003) (discussing whether international
criminal tribunals prevent or exacerbate mass atrocities and other human rights violations). For discussions about the ICC’s focus on Africa, see Margaret M. deGuzman, Is the
ICC (International Criminal Court) Targeting Africa Inappropriately?, ICC F.,
http://iccforum.com/Africa [https://perma.cc/CD26-J2PC].
117. For some recent contributions see Kevin Jon Heller, Can the Security Council
Implicitly Amend the Rome Statute?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:02 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/15/can-the-security-council-implicitly-amend-the-rome-statute
[https://perma.cc/UD4Y-4STB] (arguing that the ICC has no obligation to comply with a
UN Security Council referral that does not meet the requirements of Article 13(b) of the
Rome Statute); INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ICC
AND
THE
SECURITY COUNCIL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2013),
https://www.ipinst.org/2013/03/the-relationship-between-the-icc-and-the-security-councilchallenges-and-opportunities [https://perma.cc/R5SY-38FQ].
118. Arguments to reform aspects of Council practice abound. A wave of scholarship
contemplated possible models for Council reform from the mid-90s to the beginning of the
millennium. Since the permanent five have the authority to veto any proposed reform of
the UN Charter, the likelihood, however, that the permanent membership of the Council
will change is quite low. See, e.g., DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS (1999); David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552 (1993); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The

Relationship Between the Security Council and the Projected International Criminal
Court, 3 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 97 (1998).
119. Rebecca J. Hamilton, The ICC’s Exit Problem, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (2014).
120. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 651 (“The Court centers on a prosecutorial

mechanism that is incapable of meeting the very standard of legitimacy that its advocates
have invoked to justify its existence. For that reason, the existence of prosecutorial authority poses a far greater challenge to the mission of the ICC than does, for example, the narrower debate over whether the Rome Statute contains sufficient protections against bias or
prosecutorial abuse.”); Elizabeth C. Minogue, Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security

Council’s Chapter VII Authority in the Current Situations Before the International Criminal Court, 61 VAND. L. REV. 647, 677 (2008) (“Instead, the ICC must consider changes it

could make to its structure and jurisdiction in order to gain the United States’, and thus
the Security Council’s, full backing and support and whether these changes would unfairly
bias the ICC in favor of the United States.”); Victor Peskin, Assessing the Contemporary
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targeting the Council-ICC relationship to consider how using her discretion, the Prosecutor might both increase the ICC’s effectiveness121
and the meaningfulness of its prosecutions by addressing (some)
States Parties’ concerns that the ICC is nothing more than an agent
of the Council in dealing with its referrals.

A. Prosecutorial Discretion, the ICC and the Council
In the past, ICC Prosecutors have mostly tried to cooperate with
the Council and have mostly refrained from pressing the Council in
an aggressive fashion. 122 Luis Moreno-Ocampo and Fatou Bensouda,
the former and incumbent ICC Prosecutors, for example, have both
complied with the Security Council’s resolution-based requests to be
updated on the ICC’s progress twice a year, respectively, in the
Council-referred situations in the Sudan and in Libya. So, in December 2014, when Prosecutor Bensouda announced she would freeze
investigations in the Sudan cases,123 her announcement made headlines. Indeed, President Al-Bashir understandably greeted the Prosecutor’s announcement triumphantly, claiming that the ICC had
“failed” in its mission. 124
International Criminal Tribunals: Performance, Persuasion, and Politics, 108 AM. SOC’Y

INT’L L. PROC. 122, 125 (2014) (“More specifically, these African leaders have sought to
undermine the ICC’s moral authority by alleging that the Court is a politicized body driven
by anti-African bias. This has real consequences for the ICC’s already uphill battle to persuade regional and international actors for concrete support with arrests, witness protection, and other forms of state cooperation crucial for institutional effectiveness.”); Colonel
Stuart W. Risch, Hostile Outsider or Influential Insider? The United States and the International Criminal Court, ARMY LAW. 61, 66 (2009) (“Accordingly, the United States, which
still has an opportunity to play a significant role with the Court—and regain its reputation
for an unyielding commitment to promoting human rights, justice, and the rule of law—
should ratify the Rome Statute or, at a minimum, adopt a strategy and policy of conciliation and cooperation instead of obstruction and antagonism.”).
121. For purposes of this Article, I focus on goal-oriented effectiveness, centering on the
goals of the mandate holders, which usually include primary norm compliance, dispute
resolution, regime support, and regime legitimization. There are tradeoffs between each of
these goals. See Shany, supra note 13, at 265; see also discussion infra Part IV. Within the
Court, different mandate holders may also focus on different goals. For an excellent article
analyzing some of the difficult tradeoffs involved in case selection, see, Margaret M.
deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal
Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012).
122. See generally True-Frost, International Civil Servant, supra note 31.
123. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., supra note 2. The first Prosecutor was elected by the
Assembly of State Parties in 2003 and Prosecutor Bensouda was elected in 2011. Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, GETNICK & GETNICK COUNSELLORS AT L., http://getnicklaw.com/ourteam/luis-moreno-ocampo/ [https://perma.cc/7SWF-V93C]; Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L
CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp?ln=en [https://perma.cc/N9B4-DQ5G].
124. Sudan’s President: ICC ‘Failed’ in Prosecution Effort, VOA NEWS (Dec. 13, 2014,
11:59 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/icc-suspends-sudan-war-crimes-inquiry/2557685.html
[https://perma.cc/UM7L-L8W8]. The Court has had difficulty with many cases recently, for
example, the Prosecutor’s announcement about Al-Bashir came in close succession to her

2016]

WEAPONS OF THE WEAK

295

The ICC currently is at risk of becoming irrelevant through its slow
progress in cases, its inability to secure the support it requires in the
States where it is investigating and prosecuting, and its failure to secure referrals of critical situations from the Council. 125 The Prosecutor’s
declining a referral by the Council in the future, along with a statement
of the reasons why, might well allow the ICC to preserve valuable resources. The ICC could focus on situations referred by its mandate
holders or initiated by the Prosecutor, and might build a more constructive relationship with the Council regarding future referrals.126
As the Assembly of State Parties has recently acknowledged, the
Prosecutor’s capacity to control the flow of cases and resources will be
critical to the future effectiveness of the ICC. 127 That so many States
Parties are dissatisfied with the ICC’s docket and results matters,
not least because the ICC’s capacity to effectuate results still depends
on its ability to marshal support from its State Parties. Of course, all
“international institutions, their officials and outcomes are accorded
legitimacy to the extent that they conform to the legal requirements
set out in their founding treaties . . . .,” 128 but for a Court whose enforcement capacity rests entirely with its members, this legitimacy is
even more critical.
Under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor has the legal authority to
decline a Council referral in the interests of justice. 129 The Prosecutor’s 2003 Policy Paper notes, “States and the Office have to evaluate
how successful investigations and prosecutions can be in situations
where the necessary cooperation is lacking. Cooperation becomes
more than ever before a critical success factor if the Office is going to
achieve positive results.” 130 At this adolescent point in the ICC’s inOffice’s withdrawal of charges against the President of Kenya. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr. Kenyatta (Mar.
13, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1936247.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M9U-UPA8].
125. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 119 (arguing that the ICC needs an exit strategy to
be more efficient in its work and to ameliorate some of its problems).
126. Not all situations referred by mandate holders are equal, and this argument does
not engage the related but distinct question of whether the Prosecutor might refuse to investigate some State self-referrals. For more on the implications and broader framework,
see infra Part V.
127. Strategic Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 6 (“Despite improvements in Office resources over the past two years, resources are still insufficiently aligned with the demands
placed upon the Office for intervention . . . .”).
128. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at 271.
129. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 53, ¶¶ 1-2.
130. Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2012-2015 at 5, ¶ 3.
Id. at 13, ¶19 (“The Office however faces an even bigger challenge . . . [as] the investigative
tools it has available are more limited and depend on State cooperation. Specialized investigative techniques are in most cases not feasible or available (e.g. infiltration, interception
of voice and electronic communication, controlled delivery, etc). Such obstacles can only be
overcome if the Office if getting full cooperation from all partners involved.”); Strategic
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stitutional history, the Prosecutor’s reasoned consideration of declination is merited in order “to guarantee lasting respect for and the
enforcement of international justice.” 131
In making the decision to decline to investigate or to prosecute a
Council referral, the Prosecutor would of course be mindful that the
decision may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 132 Regardless of
whether upholding or overturning the Prosecutor’s decision to decline, such review could well add to the legitimacy of the Prosecutor’s
decision.133 Still the full legal and practical scope of the Prosecutor’s
discretion remains largely unchartered.

B. Mechanisms of Influence: The Power of the Weak
The Prosecutor’s authority and discretion are composed of both
soft and hard power. This Section unpacks the theoretical underpinning of the potential power of declination in order to better understand the possibility that the Prosecutor might abstain from acting
on a Council referral. By offering an explanation when she does so,
she can use her power to persuade. This is her main weapon for possibly increasing the ICC’s effectiveness in cases of Council referrals.
It also allows her to focus valuable resources on the Court’s
mandate holders. 134
Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 13, ¶ 26 (“As already mentioned in the Strategic Plan (June
2012-2015), ‘States and the Office have to evaluate how successful investigations and pros-

ecutions can be conducted in situations where the necessary cooperation is lacking. Cooperation becomes more than ever before a critical success factor if the Office is going to
achieve positive results.’ ”).
131. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl.
132. Id. at art. 53, ¶ 3.

133. Recently, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC implicitly endorsed broader prosecutorial authority for the OTP. Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Case No.
ICC-01/13, Notice of Appeal of “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation,” (July 27, 2015),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2024328.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXW4-9RK7]. When, in
November 2015, the Appeals Chamber declined the Prosecutor’s appeal, it also indirectly
affirmed the Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate the situation of the Mavi Marmara.
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Case No. ICC-01/13 OA, Decision on
the Admissibility of the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the “Decision on the request of the
Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation,”
(Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2152672.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVZ7HC8X]; Situation on the Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, Case No.
ICC-01/13, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s
decision not to initiate an investigation, (July 16, 2015), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2015869.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ7D-GVE9].
134. ICC States Parties are all mandate holders in the enterprise of international criminal law and bear responsibilities for enforcing the provisions of the Rome Statute in ways
that non-State Parties Council members do not. Mandate holders may try to use the Court
for their own goals, which may not align well with those of other mandate holders, victims,
or the Court overall.
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This possible course of action is situated at the intersection of constructivist and rational choice theory—probing as it does the outer
limits of norm diffusion.135 The proposal stems from the concern that
the ICC’s capacity to promote and diffuse ICL norms in situations
referred by the Council is limited by the Council’s lack of support and
enforcement. From a constructivist perspective, 136 State interests can
be shaped and norms can be supported and diffused even in the
face of tremendous power asymmetries. Over time, States may internalize ICL norms, even in the face of non-enforcement at the
international level.
At this point in the Court’s work, ongoing lack of funding, support,
and the non-compliance by Council members in these high-profile
referred cases, however, exacerbates the negative optics for the Court
more than it assists in norm diffusion. Thus, the ICC Prosecutor
might prepare to say no to the Council in the interests of justice for a
number of reasons—some animated by constructivist concerns, but
also some stemming from rational choice approaches.
Rather than taking State self-interest as a given, constructivists
are interested in the content of State interests and the social
processes through which norms diffuse. 137 Indeed, simple rational
calculations of self-interest are not sufficient motivators of States’
behavior—rather a satisfactory account of causal motivators requires
consideration of norms and beliefs.138 Constructivists do not deny
that self-interest is causally significant, but argue instead that ideas
meaningfully shape States’ perceptions of what is in their selfinterest. 139 For these scholars, norms may have a causal power of
their own. According to Martha Finnemore’s theory of norm diffusion
135. Norm diffusion is defined as the process by which “collectively held ideas about
behavior” are promoted. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 22-23 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
136. Social science-oriented, constructivist political scientists and many legal scholars
emphasize the ideational and constitutive role of norms in shaping actors’ preferences. For
these scholars, State interests are a product of social processes. See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L
ORG. 887 (1998); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? NeoUtilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998) (discussing the historical development of constructivism); Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT’L SECURITY 71 (1995).
137. See James Fearon & Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 52 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002); FINNEMORE, supra note 135, at 3-4.
138. FINNEMORE, supra note 135, at 2-3.
139. Id. at 15 (“Socially constructed rules, principles, norms of behavior, and shared
beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with understandings of what is
important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of obtaining those
valued goods.”).
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at the international level, realists’ causal arrows can be reversed and
international organizations and NGOs can be seen to shape the
interests of States.140 Norm-based international legal theorists
emphasize the content, or legitimacy, of the international norm and
the process of legal interactions that lead to its horizontal or
vertical integration.141
For rational choice-based (neo)realist and institutionalist
theorists, however, in the anarchic world of international relations,142
States act rationally to maximize self-interest and power. 143 For these
theorists, norms (such as ICL norms) promoted by international
organizations and States, are mere cloaks for the instrumental goals
of the most powerful States. 144
That the Prosecutor might use her weapon of discretion to decline
future Council referrals is a controversial suggestion 145 emanating
140. Id. at 13, 22.
141. Thomas Franck’s legitimacy theory and Abram and Antonia Chayes’s managerial
legal process theory are norm-based approaches. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 22-25 (1995) (emphasizing intergovernmental cooperation as an effective
alternative to coercive enforcement mechanisms in their managerial legal process theory);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 43-49 (1990) (arguing
that compliance with international law will be secured when a legal norm is perceived to be
fair and legitimate).
142. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1979).
143. See generally Fearon & Wendt, supra note 137, at 61 (arguing that international
law emerges from States acting rationally to maximize their interests).
144. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
139 (2005); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in REGIME
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1995). Rational choicebased contractual institutionalists also believe that States pursue “self-interest,” but differ
from (neo)realists by accepting that international organizations’ coordination can affect
State behavior. Contractual institutionalists argue that institutions change the cost-benefit
analysis of State actors by encouraging short-term cooperation for long-term power interests. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 107 (1984). Rational choice-based liberal theorists peer into the black
box of State “interest” to ascertain what occurs at the national level. While they agree that
States adopt human rights norms and laws out of self-interest, they argue that State interests are defined by the preferences of individuals and national interest groups within the
State. In response to interest group pressure and tactics, States promote the norms advocated by these groups through legal processes. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the
Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 177, 205 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 516-20 (1997); AnneMarie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, Lecture Before Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting, in 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 240, 241 (2000).
145. She may be playing hardball in using her discretion in this way. Mark Tushnet,
Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004) (describing legal and
political moves “within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that
are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings”).
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from an acceptance that, in the context of diffusing international
criminal law norms in particular, the ICC would do well to focus on
the support of its mandate holders.
In making a declination, the Prosecutor should consider the possible motives of various Council members in making referrals to the
ICC. 146 Of course Council members’ motives need not exactly match
the goals of the ICC, but any disconnect may indeed be relevant to
the Prosecutor’s decision-making. Council referrals arguably allow
the Council to engage crises without assuming direct responsibility
for the outcomes that follow. Council referrals to the ICC lower the
political costs for the Council organ, which might otherwise be accused of inaction—a vast political science literature describes how
courts lower the political costs for other actors, 147 even as they might
also concurrently raise the costs for the ICC. 148 When the referral appears to be merely a pressure release valve for the Council, the Prosecutor might consider declining.
Regardless of the outcome of a particular ICC referral, in the
short-term, the Council organ arguably benefits. United Nations
Member States’ arguably perceive the Security Council’s commitment
to its collective mandate to preserve international peace and security.

C. Limitations to and Concerns About Prosecutorial Declination of
Council Referrals
This Section sets out some basic limitations regarding the idea of
declining a Council referral to improve the effectiveness of the Court
and addresses some concerns about the idea. As to limitations, first,
this Article provides reasons the Prosecutor might understandably
decide to decline Council referrals and identifies some of the relevant
consequences and implications of such a decision, but it is beyond the
scope of this Article to define precisely the situations in which the
Prosecutor should say no to the UN Security Council. In addition, it
is beyond the scope of this Article to provide the full legal argument
justifying the Prosecutor’s declining to investigate or prosecute a Security Council referral in the interests of justice. A preliminary interpretation of the law circumscribing the Prosecutor’s discretion un-

146. While in many cases, it may be difficult to definitively establish what these motivations are, the Council’s open debates usually disclose the official reason for the State’s
action in International Criminal Court. See, e.g., Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013, supra note 90; Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014,
supra note 90; Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, supra note 90.
147. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 24.
148. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role
in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EURO. L. 565, 588-92 (2006).
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der Article 51 supports her power to do so. 149 The Prosecutor broadening her interpretation of Article 53’s interests of justice standard
would leave her open to criticisms of selective justice. Given the constrained jurisdiction of the Court, this criticism is to some degree inescapable. The Prosecutor would need to explain her rationale for
declination clearly. Given the evidence surveyed here, the Council’s
political processes have arguably not, thus far, been compatible with
effective ICC adjudication.

1. The Long-Term Success of the Institution Should Be Valued by
the Prosecutor
The Rome Statute’s preamble includes the goal that “serious
crimes . . . must not go unpunished,” 150 yet as the ICC is necessarily
one of limited jurisdiction that is structurally incapable of reaching
many crimes, and to the extent that it is constrained by the cooperation of its Member States, its broadest preambular goals are, at present, arguably aspirational. At this point in the ICC’s tenure, it is not
clear that the object and purpose of the statute and the interests of
victims are served by having the ICC ineffectively plunge into an investigation and prosecution. Rather, this Article assumes that it is in
the long-term interests of the global community, including victims of
atrocity, for an independent ICC to establish its authority within the
scope of its jurisdiction, and not to struggle for survival and political
support. Given the many challenges the ICC faces, prosecutorial declination and restraint, even in the face of possible massive atrocities,
might well be helpful tools for the longevity of the Court. Although
there will be short-term costs to declination, including allowing a situation to go unaddressed by the Court, viewed over the long-term,
the goals of the ICC and its mandate holders may be helped by de149. Briefly, the argument is that the Prosecutor can legally decline to investigate or to
prosecute Security Council referrals in the interests of justice. The preamble of the Rome
Statute, inter alia, reaffirms the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, affirms that
serious crimes must not go unpunished, determines to put an end to impunity, and resolves
“to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice.” Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl. The legal argument that the Prosecutor can decline to investigate a Council referral in the interests of justice is more fully developed in a working paper
titled, Saying No to the Security Council in the Interests of Justice. C. Cora True-Frost,
Saying No to the Security Council in the Interests of Justice (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author). The Rome Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor lay out the legal rules for whether the Prosecutor
should proceed with an investigation or must prosecute. The Prosecutor’s Policy Papers
and letters represent non-binding interpretations of the Rome Statute and Regulations. In
addition, ICC case law, which is non-precedential, but highly influential, is developing a
more sophisticated understanding of the parameters of prosecution discretion. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 20 (listing the areas of applicable law in ICC trials, not including
reference to prior case precedent).
150. Rome Statute, supra note 6, at pmbl.
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clining a Council referral in the short-term for the reasons laid out
above. Declination need not be an irresponsible move for a Prosecutor
responding to a Council that has arguably violated the intent of the
drafters of the Rome Statute, including for example, by restricting
the Court’s ability to secure funding.151

2. Assumptions About Collective Action
This Article’s focus is on improving a critical aspect of the ICC’s
long-term effectiveness: its relationship with the Council. This Article assumes that both the Prosecutor’s Office and the Council organ
are ultimately invested in their respective institutions’ longevity.
Some readers may dispute this methodological assumption, arguing
that because the Prosecutor works in an organization with four different organs, including the Assembly of State Parties, and the
Council is composed of many Member States, the various parties’ motivations matter. To speak meaningfully about effectiveness, therefore, the interests of the individual players within the organs must be
disaggregated. There are multiple interests at stake within each institution and organ, but the reputation of both the UN and the ICC
will rise or fall with each one’s ability to accomplish their respective
goals. 152 While future analysis of micro-level interactions within each
of the organs and how they may in turn affect the over-all goals of
these institutions might well be helpful to better understanding
which referrals to decline, such analysis will likely not vitiate the
basic assumption that over-all, members of these collective organs
have an interest in their own organs’ continued longevity.

3. Council Referrals May Be Meaningfully Treated as a Distinct
Class
Some readers may wonder why this Article treats Council referrals as a unique class of referrals at all. 153 Why not broaden this inquiry about the prosecutorial discretion to decline cases, to include
151. The Prosecutor will certainly preliminarily examine the situation. Such an examination may make declining to prosecute even more politically unpalatable, as tremendous
crimes might be unearthed. The Prosecutor will need to explain why she is declining, and
she will face the possibility that the PTC will reverse her decision and request her to reconsider. Doing so may increase the costs for the Security Council associated with referring
a situation to the ICC.
152. See YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
22 (2014); Anthony Banbury, Opinion, I Love the U.N., but It Is Failing, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/i-love-the-un-butit-is-failing.html?_r=0.
153. Indeed, Leslie Vinjamuri argues that the ICC has extensive authority without
having narrow or intermediate authority in both Security Council and proprio motu referrals alike. See Vinjamuri, supra note 43, at 279.
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State self-referrals that the Prosecutor might decline? First, this Article argues that Security Council referrals raise unique effectiveness
and legitimacy concerns; as elaborated further below, not least because they simultaneously prohibit funding for the ICC’s work on
Council referrals. Unlike States Parties, the Council incurs no actual
costs when it refers situations to the ICC, even as it receives the benefit of appearing to have addressed a particular situation. Its referrals of non-consenting States to the ICC also raise concerns about
extending the authority of the Court absent enforcement power of a
kind not present in State self-referrals. In addition, the Prosecutor
already has declined to move beyond a preliminary examination in
State self-referrals. 154 However, this is not so in the case of the two
Council referrals of non-Member States Parties.
Some readers may object that two Council referrals is too small a
class from which to generalize about future actions. To this point, it
is important to recall that this Article examines the possible wisdom
of declination, but does not argue that the Prosecutor should decline
every Council referral. In addition, while Libya and the Sudan were
indeed distinguishable from each other and other ICC cases in many
ways, they do share the Council-driven characteristics mentioned
above—they lack funding and the Council has not supported the
Court’s actions.
Relatedly, some might argue that the class of independent proprio
motu investigations raise more concerns than do Council referrals,
initiated as they are by a single person, and not vetted by a multimember, longstanding international authority with a mandate to
preserve international peace and security. The Prosecutor’s unilateral use of discretion can indeed compromise the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC in various ways. As mentioned above, however,
proprio motu referrals have already received tremendous attention in
literature. In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s required approval of
prosecutorial-initiated investigations and prosecutions diminishes
concerns about a rogue prosecutor. 155 But most importantly, the Office of the Prosecutor’s goals (and motives) in opening proprio motu
investigations are better aligned with the long-term goals of the ICC
than are the goals of the multi-member Security Council organ. The
Prosecutor not only has an intimate understanding of the budget of
the ICC, but she also has an incentive to use her discretion effectively
154. For example, the Prosecutor has initiated preliminary examinations and continued such examinations for long periods of time without opening an investigation. Report on
Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, supra note 90, at 26-51. Indeed, four preliminary examinations have been open for five to eleven years; Colombia has been open since
2004, Afghanistan since 2007, Guinea since 2009, and Nigeria since 2010. Id. at 26, 32, 40.
155. See Danner, supra note 27, at 518.
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to maintain her position in a system of justice respected for its fairness and independence by as many mandate holders as possible. 156

4. Declination Is Consistent with the Object and Purpose of the
Rome Statute
Others may argue that it would be irresponsible for the Prosecutor
to decline to investigate a Council referral—that to do so would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, representing the
Prosecutor’s “failure to respect the legal limits set by the mandate
providers [which] would undermine the legitimacy of [the ICC] and
may lead to a legal or political backlash against them.” 157 The argument might continue, where the Council succeeds in agreeing that
there is a threat to international peace and security, there will likely
also be international crimes. 158 The Prosecutor’s failure to proceed in
such a situation could undermine the ICC’s objective. Alternately, the
Prosecutor’s expansion of the conception of the interests of justice to
decline to prosecute in such a situation will open the Court to even
more claims of bias. At the same time, however, and as alluded to the
Prosecutor’s Policy on Case Selection, it should be recalled that the
ICC is a court of limited resources. It simply cannot prosecute all
cases. Discretion in case selection is necessary but also leaves the
Prosecutor open to claims of bias. The Prosecutor has made it clear
that the Office prefers to prosecute where there is jurisdiction and
that her job is to pursue justice. But this does not necessarily preclude her ability to decline a Council referral in the interests of justice—that the ICC will not be able to serve justice in these Councilreferred cases absent support from the Council is borne out by the
referrals so far.
That the jurisdictional and enforcement constraints within which
the Prosecutor must operate make it nearly impossible for the Prosecutor to avoid critiques of bias would not be a full vindication of a
strategy of declination of a Council referral. In policy papers, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has already necessarily defined a certain
subset of cases that will be priority cases for the Office. 159 These poli156. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 370 (1997); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 24, at 906.
157. SHANY, supra note 152, at 7.
158. It is important to note that a class of situations exists where there may in fact be a
threat to international peace and security, but there may nonetheless not be a cognizable
international crime that falls within the ICC’s jurisdiction. But this Article deals with
broader cases, those in which there may well be triable offenses present.
159. Int’l Crim. Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritisation, (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTPPolicy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9C3-FU4Z].
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cy papers both help explain and informally limit the prosecutor’s discretion. Thus, in the case of declination, the Prosecutor might also
wisely elaborate the ways that another unsupported Council referral
will not serve the interests of justice. The OTP’s recent policy paper
on case selection, has refined earlier policies in order to help the Office of the Prosecutor achieve success and to conserve resources.160 If
the Prosecutor declines to exercise jurisdiction over a situation in a
non-State Party in the interests of justice, it will certainly open the
Office to criticism, but will also be consistent with the Office’s recent
explicit focus on resources of the ICC and the need to focus on cases
where success is possible. 161
The Prosecutor can use her soft power, the power to explain her
discretion to anticipate and respond to criticisms. She can explain
that Council-referred cases will likely be nearly impossible to investigate and prosecute—those that are in non-consenting non-States
Parties with ongoing conflicts. That rationale and her decision may
well be reviewed by the PTC.162 Not only will her assessment of the
likelihood of success in Council referrals likely be important to the
PTC, but the Prosecutor’s use of her soft power and her explanation
of her reasons for inaction may be central to how successful she is in
conveying to the Council the burdens the Council has placed on the
ICC. The Prosecutor’s denial in the interests of justice must make it
clear that prosecution is necessary (if, indeed, she finds it to be so),
but that at present, without a show of more support from the international community, the ICC will not be able to proceed effectively.
Some readers will argue that the interests of justice never permit
compromise, and that bad actors should be prosecuted, regardless of
the cost to the institution. This consequentialist argument has some
foundation in the Rome Statute, but this interpretation focuses on
the utilitarian and expressive values of the Court’s prosecutions. As
stated above, norms matter within this Article’s framework, but a
160. Strategic Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 16, ¶ 36 (“The Office published its policy
paper on preliminary examinations in November 2013. This policy clarifies the process and
criteria applied by the Office in accordance with the Rome Statute in deciding on whether
or not to open an investigation. Complementary to this policy, the Office is working on a
case selection and case prioritisation policy which will clarify how the Office decides which
cases to pursue once a situation has been opened for investigation. Two aspects are being
considered within this policy: (1) how to identify cases that the Office should pursue, and (2)
how to prioritise amongst those cases if the demands placed upon the Office exceed[] the Office’s resources. Subsequently, the Office will define its policy on how it proposes to end its
involvement in a situation under investigation, the so-called: ‘exit strategy’ for situations.”).
161. See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, supra note 90, at 4.
162. But see, deGuzman, supra note 121, at 296 (“In fact, due to the malleability of the
factor-based approach to assessing gravity as well as the ‘interests of justice,’ a claim that
the prosecutor adheres to ex ante standards for selection decisions may actually undermine
the Court’s efforts to build legitimacy.”).
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starting point for this analysis is the reality that the ICC is a court of
limited jurisdiction, which requires the ICC necessarily to weigh the
likelihood of success of prosecution. Also, to respond to consequentialist concerns, as mentioned above, diplomats and politicians have already increasingly discussed establishing ad hoc tribunals to fill gaps
in the Rome Statute framework, so gaps resulting from prosecutorial
declination may be filled in other ways.163
At any rate, declination need not mean that crimes go unpunished. International criminal law scholars agree that it is increasingly likely that the Council will establish ad hoc tribunals, or regional
tribunals to address some threats to international peace and security,
as part of the regime of international criminal law. 164 Whether or not
the return to ad hoc tribunals is a good development for the international criminal law regime, the Prosecutor may treat the renewed
interest in ad hoc tribunals as an opportunity for her to shift the
burden to the Council, and to use her discretion to limit the situations the ICC pursues.

5. Effects on Institutional Relations with the UN Security Council
Informed readers might also be concerned that the ICC cannot
afford to alienate the Council by declining a referral. After all, many
of the successes of the ad hoc tribunals in securing custody over missing defendants were contingent on the behind-the-scenes coercive
pressure of key members of the Council. But the Council has simply
not been willing to offer support for ICC prosecutions and, as this Article elaborates, 165 that failure has been costly for the ICC, which
needs to move forward conservatively at this point in its life cycle. A
related concern is that an alienated Council would retaliate by delaying different Court proceedings for a year. Indeed, one indirect form
of support the Council has provided 166 the Court has been to decline
to defer ongoing proceedings when requested to do so by the AU.167 It
is certainly a risk, as the Council is a powerful, longstanding organ.
But as the Kadi case in the European Union, demonstrates there has
been indirect review of Council decisions and processes.168 A retalia163. H.R. Res. 269, 114th Cong. (2015).
164. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 69, at 1067-68; Stephens, supra note 69, at 504.
165. See, e.g., infra Table 3.
166. Only narrowly—the vote was close on whether to defer.
167. See ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59, at 67, ¶ 38.
168. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l
Found. v. Council of the European Union & Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R.
I-06351; see Cora True-Frost, The Development of Individual Standing in International
Security, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1183, 1187 n.8 (2011) [hereinafter True-Frost, Development
of Individual Standing] (“In the Kadi decision, the European Court of Justice annulled a
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tion from the Council could be costly to the Council, too, however, as
past practice has demonstrated that the Council has sometimes adjusted its procedures in response to tremendous backlash from
member States. 169

6. Effects on Relations with States Parties
The ICC has the greatest geographic and temporal reach of any
international criminal tribunal to date, even as the Rome Statute
gives it limited jurisdiction. 170 There is a concern that a denial by the
ICC Prosecutor of a Council referral would cause some Rome Statute
States Parties to reconsider their membership in the ICC. At the
same time, States Parties ratified the Rome Statute knowing that
many powerful States were not joining the Rome Statute framework.
Universal membership remains an aspiration, and there are frequent
threats of exit, but no State has yet left.

7. Council Referrals Uncoupled by Its Support Test the Limits of
the Expressive Value of International Criminal Law
A central theoretical assumption behind the Prosecutor declining
a referral is that there are limits to the expressive value of a prosecution at this point in the Court’s life. Some would respond, however,
that any Council referral, regardless of its outcomes, has value.
Council referrals, the argument would continue, promote and diffuse
the norms of international criminal law, and the Prosecutor is therefore duty-bound to investigate and prosecute if there is sufficient evidence. In other words, because the norms of ICL are supported regardless of the immediate outcome of a particular situation, even
when the indictee remains at large, there is expressive value in proceeding. As demonstrated in Section IV.B., infra, there is some evidence to support this view, but it is not a settled matter. Earlier in
the ICC’s existence, when the prospect of Council enforcement of a
referral was still viable, the view that the ICC’s long-term effectiveness was not contingent on its ability to enforce in Council referredsituations was more persuasive.

European Council Regulation implementing targeted sanctions on the grounds that it violated ‘the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective
judicial review of those rights.’ ”).
169. See Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found., 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 at ¶ 225;
ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE
OF LAW (2012).
170. “South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress, said in a statement over the weekend that the International Criminal Court was not ‘useful’ to prosecute
crimes against humanity because membership is voluntary.” Onishi, supra note 111.
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At this point in the ICC’s existence, however, the ICC faces numerous challenges. Recognition from the Council is no longer one of
them; rather follow-through from all Council members is critical.

8. Declination Could Affect the Deterrence Goals of the Court
Related, a concern is what impact declination would have on deterrence. Whether the ICC actually deters is the subject of an active
debate, 171 but there are multiple anecdotal accounts of the deterrence
effects of ICC prosecutions on various leaders. 172 The analysis below
of the effectiveness of Council referrals to the ICC preliminarily indicates that Council referrals have yielded prosecutions that have been
actively undermined by traveling, or at-large, high-profile indictees.
Which is more damaging to the deterrence effect of the Court,
frustrated prosecutions or the ICC Prosecutor’s declination in similar situations? Although prosecutions need not result in convictions in order to have a deterrent effect, to the extent the Prosecution can either inculcate Council support for its referrals at this
phase in the Court’s development or avoid the dilemma entirely
through declination, this might help ameliorate the issue of atlarge defendants in Council-referred matters. The relationship between law and politics is notoriously complicated, but the ICC is
an institution of law that is uniquely affected and constrained by
the political whims of the Council. This concern is also related to
the expressive value of the prosecutions.
What follows is an exploration of how declination might help the
effectiveness of the Court.
IV. USING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION COULD IMPROVE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
COUNCIL
The multiple contradictions and stalemates of Council ICCreferral practice will likely continue to create difficulties for the ICC
to effectively promote criminal law norms; resolve specific cases; and
171. See generally Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals
Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006) (finding

that international criminal tribunals have low deterrent effect because targets of prosecution likely already face informal sanctions such as death, imprisonment, or torture).
172. See Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court Deter
Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 449 (2014) (providing the example of two rebel groups in Colombia, and how both “have published internal documents assessing the likelihood of prosecution by the ICC or domestic courts. ICC investigations, indictments, and convictions or
those triggered by complementarity are likely to encourage actual or potential perpetrators
to reassess the risks of punishment—[often relative to impunity]—and to moderate
their behavior”).
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to focus on strengthening relationships with mandate holders of the
Rome Statute.173 This Article assumes that in the short-term, the
Council is unlikely to alter its ICC-referral practices, the earnest arguments of international law scholars and diplomats notwithstanding. 174 The ICC will almost certainly receive another Council referral
in the future, however. In this Section, I analyze the various impacts
of the ICC’s relationship with the Council on its own effectiveness, by
interrogating multiple related goals. Under this framework, the five
“generic” goals of international courts are: (1) norm support, (2) resolving international disputes and problems, (3) regime support, (4)
legitimizing public authority, and (5) idiosyncratic goals.175
Core effectiveness issues in the relationship between the Council
and Court are framed here for future analysis; a preliminary analysis
of how the Council is assisting the Court in achieving its goals is set
forth. The goals analyzed here are inspired by a goal-oriented conceptual framework of effectiveness, which focuses specifically on the
normative expectations of the States Parties that formed the tribunal, the mandate holders. 176
This conceptual framework takes us beyond viewing effectiveness
of international tribunals merely as successful prosecutions, judgment-compliance, or the effects of the court on State conduct.177 In173. In March 23, 2006, the Prosecutor stated, “Darfur presents new challenges for the
Court. The security situation in Darfur means that . . . . [n]o one can conduct a judicial
investigation in Darfur.” SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 49.
174. The Council is not entirely impervious to arguments for change. For example, the
Council has reformed many of its procedures in response to judicial and political pressure.
See, e.g., True-Frost, Development of Individual Standing, supra note 168, at 1207. The
Council was expanded in 1965 from six to ten elected members. Still, in recent years, the
Council has remained unresponsive to arguments for reform of the structure of the Council. See sources sited supra note 121.
175. SHANY, supra note 152, at 44. Shany examines alternatives to the goal-oriented
approach to measuring effectiveness, including, for example, the open system approach,
which he rejects for failing to conduct “a more purposive inquiry into judicial conduct.” Id.
at 15. He also rejects the process-oriented model and strategic constituency model because
of the multiplicity of constituencies in international courts. Id. at 16. It should be noted
that the concept of effectiveness is distinguishable from efficiency or cost-effectiveness.
Given the jurisdictional and enforcement constraints the ICC faces, focusing on the expectations of the mandate holders at this point seems wise. An action is effective if it “accomplishes its specific objective aim.” Id. at 14.
176. SHANY, supra note 152, at 7 (“[A]s a matter of good policy, [courts should seek to
accommodate] the normative expectations of their mandate providers.”). The goals of a
broad and varied range of constituencies of the ICC might also be considered, including
NGOs, civil society, victims of crimes, and potential perpetrators of crimes.
177. Id. at 4, 15. In order to measure whether goals have been attained, Shany recommends using operational categories and performance indicators. Id. at 20 (using
structural indicators as outcome predictors including: legal powers (determined by jurisdiction, ancillary powers, how binding judicial decisions are, applicable law, etc.); personnel capacity (determined by number of judges, employees, legal-assistance procedures, and actual and perceived quality of personnel); resources (determined by short
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stead, this approach to understanding effectiveness also considers
the longer-term systemic contribution of courts to development governance. Although this effectiveness framework is primarily descriptive, it also incorporates normative assessment of courts. So, whether
a court affected States in a “desirable” way may be considered in
assessing effectiveness. 178
State parties to the Rome Statute agreed to establish the ICC to
work towards the goals of promoting internalization of norms, developing ICL norms, ending impunity, achieving deterrence, resolving
disputes by promoting peace and security, promoting victim satisfaction, and establishing a historical record of the atrocities.179 The goals
of the ICC also include promoting domestic proceedings against violators of ICL and legitimizing the application of ICL by conveying a
message of condemnation. 180 The history of the ICC’s relationship
with the Council, detailed above, hints at the mismatch between the
goals of the framers of the Rome Statute and the outcomes of the current relationship—this Section enumerates those areas of mismatch.
In a system within which the Prosecutor must balance innumerable
practical constraints: staffing, resources, and the need for State cooperation in order to enforce; the Prosecutor’s relationship with the
Council highlights some of the most prominent international peace
and security concerns. The various domains of effectiveness are
unpacked here.

A. Security Council Involvement with the ICC Somewhat Helps
Support International Criminal Law Norms, but Mostly Has Not
Helped Resolve International Disputes
The Security Council’s first referral to the ICC offered its recognition and increased the ICC’s political legitimacy among some States
Parties. The Security Council’s referral of the situation in the Sudan
contributed to ICL norms, in some ways, as it gave the ICC the op-

and long-term budgets, facilities, other tangible resources); structural independence
(determined by conditions in place to ensure that the court and its members are free
from influence of other actors and stakeholders); usage potential (determined by conditions influencing how much the court will be used, propensity of Member States to litigate, relevance of problem area and court’s applicable norms to the problems and disputes arising in occupying States); reputation (determined by perceived independence,
impartiality, legitimacy, and effectiveness); and relations with other institutions (determined by and reflected in the court’s capacity to harness domestic or international institutions to promote its objectives and implements its outputs)).
178. At the same time, Shany concedes that the leverage of mandate holders controls
finances and constrains the independence of the Council. Id. at 33.
179. Shany, supra note 13, at 239.
180. Id. at 230-36.
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portunity to indict individuals it found most responsible for the grave
crimes there.
National-level awareness of the need to hold accountable those
responsible for the Darfur atrocities has been facilitated by the
Council’s referral and the ICC’s prosecution, arguably going some
way towards the people in Sudan’s internalization of ICL norms. In
addition, although President Al-Bashir has eluded apprehension by
States Parties, his indictment helped encourage the African Union to
pressure the Sudan to pursue criminal accountability for atrocities
that have occurred in Darfur. 181 In addition, since the Security Council referral, the Sudan has set up structures for accountability,
though they fall far short of international standards.182 As mentioned
above, the Security Council refused the African Union’s requests to
defer proceedings against Al-Bashir and in the Kenya situation, although the vote was close. 183 As elaborated below, the ICC’s indictment of Al-Bashir has also, however, exacerbated concerns of selective justice, and the Council has in many ways undermined the ICC’s
efforts to end impunity, deter atrocity crimes, help States internalize
norms, and develop international legal norms through its failure to
support the ICC.
The Council’s response to the second referral of Libya in 2011 has
been complicated. Depending on how the trial of Al-Senussi proceeds,
the referral may help promote norm internalization at the domestic
level. The African Court of Human Rights issued an order to Libya to
require Gaddafi to see his lawyer in May 2013. 184 The National Transitional Council (NTC) has agreed that it is bound under the Council
resolution to cooperate with the ICC,185 but it did not surrender indictees to ICC custody, claiming instead that it could try them domestically. 186 Although this claim was disputed by the Defense and
181. Id. at 250.
182. Kate Allan, Prosecution and Peace: A Role for Amnesty Before the ICC?, 39 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 273 (2011) (“In response to the referral, the Sudanese government created the Darfur Special Criminal Court to prosecute crimes against humanity in June
2005 . . . . [I]t soon became apparent that the Court would not meet the test of genuineness.”).
183. See SCHABAS, supra note 51, at 82-83.
184. Libya and the International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers,
RIGHTS
W ATCH
(May
2013),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
H UM.
related_material/QA_Libya_ICC_May_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF2M-HPPJ].
185. UN Security Council: Press for Cooperation with ICC, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Nov.
1, 2011, 5:04 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/01/un-security-council-presscooperation-icc [https://perma.cc/ZF9D-KT39] (“The NTC is legally bound to cooperate with
the ICC, and promised to do so in a letter to the court . . . in April [2011].”).
186. In August 2015, the domestic courts in Libya sentenced both Al-Senussi and Gaddafi to death. How Libya Became the International Criminal Court’s Latest Failure, THE
CONVERSATION (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:18 AM), http://theconversation.com/how-libya-became-theinternational-criminal-courts-latest-failure-45389 [https://perma.cc/J5L7-APL4].
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the Office for Victims of the ICC,187 Libya was successful in persuading the ICC that the case of Al-Senussi should be tried there, even as
it was determined that the case of Gaddafi should proceed before
the ICC.188
Instances of the Council’s lack of support for the ICC’s promotion
of international criminal law are numerous, however. The Council’s
capacity to reach agreement is arguably at its weakest when it is delegating authority to a third-party like the ICC, a court over which it
has little control. Although initial Security Council agreement for a
referral is difficult to obtain, experience has also proven that the
Council’s support for the referrals is rarely substantial. The Council’s
first referral to the ICC supported, at least in theory, the application
of ICL to massive crimes. Yet in its referrals, the Council famously
prohibited the General Assembly and the UN from providing funding
to support ICC investigations and prosecutions. 189 For example, although the PTC of the ICC confirmed the Prosecutor’s arrest warrant
for President Omar Al-Bashir in 2009,190 the Council has still not
added Omar Al-Bashir to its targeted sanctions list. Indeed, as of December 2016, the Council has never sanctioned any ICC indictee.191
The Security Council does not advance ICL when its members
host ICC indictees. The ICC has used Article 87(7) to report Rome
Statute States Parties that have violated their international criminal
law obligations to the Council, hoping for enforcement action, but the
Council has not acted in response. It does not advance ICL when the
Council does not sanction Rome Statute members that have, for example, invited Al-Bashir to visit.192
Although Libya has amended its domestic law to provide amnesty
for atrocities that occurred during the transition,193 and the ICC has
issued findings of non-cooperation against Libya since it has failed to
surrender Gaddafi and documents to the custody of the ICC, the
187. Libya and the International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers, supra note
184, at 7-8 (noting that the ICC issued an order requiring OPCD layers to visit Gaddafi
while in detention).
188. Case Information Sheet, INT’L CRIM. COURT (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/GaddafiEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYR8-KSAA] (noting
details and case information on Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi).
189. David Kaye et al., The Council and the Court: Improving Security Council Support
of the International Criminal Court, INT’L JUST. CLINIC 21 (May 2013).
190. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
191. See supra Table 1.
192. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 86.
193. Libya: Amend New Special Procedures Law-Reject Impunity for Serious Crimes,
HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (May 11, 2012, 12:39 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/
05/11/libya-amend-new-special-procedures-law [https://perma.cc/LMA7-9TDB].
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appearance for defendants in the Sudanese and Libyan cases are the
lowest of the matters before the ICC. 197 The numbers of outstanding
arrest warrants in Council referrals also surpass those of proprio motu and self-referred cases to the ICC. 198 Despite these inherent challenges, Council referrals also lack accompanying funding. In referrals
of non-consenting States with active conflicts, unique issues related
to the safety of witnesses and investigators arise, and the costs of effective investigations and prosecutions may therefore be higher. In
the cases from these referrals, the ICC’s already limited capacity to
secure jurisdiction over defendants from these non-States Parties is
arguably even more challenged.
Any future United Nations Security Council referrals will likely be
of situations in non-State Parties to the Rome Statute. Such referrals
are also likely to be of active conflict situations, which can be more difficult for the ICC to safely and reliably investigate and prosecute.199
Although enforcement in the short-term is not vital to effectiveness of the ICC, Council-referred situations may very well damage
perceptions that the ICC is effective. Were the ICC able to work, unsupported—but also unimpeded—by the Council, the prospects for
the ICC to effectively build norms and resolve disputes among the
community of States Parties might well be greater.

B. The Security Council Does Not Help the ICC Support the Regime
of International Criminal Law (ICL)
As the Council has not only failed—over and over again—to take
action to enforce warrants of the ICC in referred situations, but also
has allowed countries that hosted Al-Bashir to do so without consequence, the Council damages the ability of the ICC to support the
regime of ICL. When permanent Council member China, and elected
Council members, Chad and Nigeria, invited indictee Al-Bashir for
State visits, they again deeply disrupted the ability of the ICC to
support the regime of ICL.200 Of course, these instances of lack of
support must be weighed against the initial referrals and the times
that the Council has indirectly supported the ICC by refusing (narrowly at times) to defer proceedings, but overall, the Security Council
has not helped support the ICC’s ICL regime.
reliance on varied forms of evidence, will help avoid the recurrence of such
challenging situations.”).
197. See supra Table 3.
198. Id.
199. See Strategic Plan 2016, supra note 37, at 14, ¶ 30.
200. See Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, supra note 81.
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Unlike many international courts, the ICC is not a subsidiary organ of a formal international organization. Its mandate is not to support the UN system, but to prosecute the most atrocious crimes
where there is the greatest risk of impunity from States unable or
unwilling to prosecute. 201 The Assembly of States Parties’ capacity to
restrict the ICC’s budget or to alter the provisions of the Rome Statute constrain the ICC’s independence. 202 Analyzing international
courts generally, Helfer and Slaughter reasonably argue that international courts seek to maintain the support of their mandate holders which leads to a certain constrained independence of international courts—this is also true for the ICC—and unsupported Council
referrals uniquely test the ICC’s capacity to secure cooperation.
In sum, at this point in time, the Council does not, on balance,
help the ICC support the regime of international criminal law, but
the Prosecutor might be able to shift the status quo using her weapon
of prosecutorial discretion.
V. COUNCIL REFERRALS CREATE UNIQUE LEGITIMACY CHALLENGES
FOR THE ICC
Legitimacy is a notoriously broad concept, and one that is extensively intertwined with the concept of effectiveness. 203 “[T]he building
blocks of judicial effectiveness also constitute [those] of judicial legitimacy.” 204 Indeed, as Professor Beetham notes, “[i]t is now a well201. Shany, supra note 13, at 237.
202. See id. at 241.
203. In the case of the ICC, legitimacy refers to the beliefs of those actors involved in
the process of international criminal law that the legal institution ought to be obeyed. According to David Beetham’s noted definition, sociological legitimacy has the following components: 1) legality or rule conformity, 2) normative validity, and 3) appropriate actions.
BEETHAM, supra note 25, at xiii (“Rules . . . are well grounded in normative beliefs accepted
by the population . . . .”). Here I mean sociological legitimacy, which includes mandate
holders’ perceptions of the ICC’s neutrality and legal and political independence. International institutions must mediate multiple contests over moral and political legitimacy in
order to optimize their sociological legitimacy. Sociological legitimacy is a “multidimensional concept.” Sociological legitimacy, as contrasted with political philosophical
understandings of legitimacy, is not the same as moral legitimacy nor is it the same as
Habermasian legitimacy. (“[T]he starting point for [analysis of] social scientific . . . [legitimacy] is to understand these principles of legitimacy and the practices which support it in
their own terms, not those we ourselves may endorse.”) Id. at xi; see also HURD, supra note
25, at 7 (“ ‘Legitimacy,’ as I use the term, refers to an actor’s normative belief that a rule or
institution ought to be obeyed.”).
204. SHANY, supra note 152, at 150-51. The concept of legitimacy is notoriously slippery. Understanding sociological legitimacy requires “a discursive analysis of the content
and rationale of people’s beliefs.” BEETHAM, supra note 25, at xi. The difference between
legitimacy in State or non-State systems is substantial. Rules are based on normative beliefs of a particular population. International organizations are perceived as legitimate
when they conform to their treaties’ legal requirements which were determined by Member
States mandate holders; and when they “perform effectively in fulfilling the common pur-
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established fact in social and political science that leaders and authorities are effective to the extent that they are perceived as having
legitimate authority and acting in accordance with prevailing norms
of appropriate conduct.” 205
For the ICC, the interrelationship between legitimacy and effectiveness is fundamental—mandate holders’ perceptions of the ICC’s
legitimacy affect their willingness to cooperate with the ICC. Reasonable legal arguments for the Prosecutor’s case selection aside, this
Article has described how according to many States Parties, the ICC
has been selectively enforcing ICL.
Professor Shany argues that one goal of the ICC is to legitimize
ICL norms by conveying a message of condemnation and ensuring
that its legal proceedings are not only legitimate, but also fair.206 Judicial systems are generally perceived by States to be more legitimate
when they are independent of politics. Yet, by design, the ICC’s dependence on State cooperation renders political concerns necessary to
its investigations and enforcement of international criminal law, and
so the ICC continues to be bedeviled by allegations of bias. The ICC’s
limited jurisdiction and reliance on State cooperation renders it vulnerable to criticisms of politicized case selection, 207 but the ICC is arguably the most vulnerable to criticism of politicized cases when it
receives referrals from the political Security Council body, including
its three non-States Parties, veto-wielding, permanent members.
The Council’s involvement with the ICC, although legally permitted under the Rome Statute, thus raises unique selective justice legitimacy concerns for an institution that already faces significant challenges. Ten years after the Council’s first referrals, it is less clear
whether its referrals have had a legitimacy-enhancing effect as more
States, including Council members, continue to flout the ICC’s rulings.208 For example, the AU’s backlash to the ICC’s indictment of AlBashir in the Sudan has arguably negatively affected both the normative validity of the ICC and the willingness of States to “comply
poses for which they were established” and according to “procedures accepted as fair.” Id.
at 271-72. Finally, international organizations are recognized as legitimate to the extent
States comply with their decisions and refrain from “acting in ways which manifestly flout
the institution’s rules.” Id. at 272. Source and procedural legitimacy are forms of legitimacy.
205. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at xi (quoting J.T. JOST & B. MAJOR, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF LEGITIMACY 4 (2001)).
206. Shany, supra note 13, at 236-37.
207. See Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 963 (2010).
208. See BOSCO, supra note 83, at 114 (quoting Christian Wenaweser). One diplomat
was noted as stating, “If the Prosecutor cannot start proprio motu investigations due to
financial constraints but continues with [Security Council] referrals then the independence
of the ICC is at risk.” Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
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with decisional outcomes, or refrain from acting in ways which manifestly flout the institution’s rules,” a component of legitimacy which
Beetham calls “performative endorsement.” 209

A. Lack of Consent, Conflicting Obligations, and Perceptions of Bias: The AU
Pointing to the all-African docket, African Union members have
claimed that Africa has been disproportionately targeted and have
particularly declaimed the ICC’s indictments of sitting heads of state.
The Office of the Prosecutor has been the primary target of many of
the bias allegations; it is the Prosecutor’s Office that is responsible
for taking the first steps to implement the ICC’s mandate. 210 When
the ICC indicted the Sudan’s head of state, Omar Al-Bashir, 211 the
AU took umbrage with the idea that a State not party to the Rome
Statute, could be viewed to have waived sovereign immunity.212
When the AU later requested the UN Security Council to defer the
case against Al-Bashir, the Council indirectly—and perhaps unintentionally—supported the ICC by ignoring this request. 213 The Council’s
209. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at 272; see Laurence Juma, Unclogging the Wheels: How
the Shift from Politics to Law Affects Africa’s Relationship with the International System,

23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (2014).
210. The AU has issued a number of decisions alleging inappropriate targeting of Africa.
See African Union [AU], African Union Decision Regarding Its Relationship With the International Criminal Court (ICC), AU Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (Oct. 12, 2013); President
Uhuru Hits out at the West Over ICC, DAILY NATION (Oct. 12, 2013),
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-Uhuru-stinging-attack-at-the-West-and-ICC--Speech/-/1056/
2029518/-/v0whudz/-/index.html [https://perma.cc/6JMS-4QV7] (alleging that the ICC is
“skewed,” “condescending,” “biased,” and “selective”); African Union [AU], Decision Regarding
the International Criminal Court (ICC), AU Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) (July 3, 2009).
211. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2009_01514.PDF.
212. For allegations that the ICC has violated sovereign immunity see International
Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Twenty-First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593
(2005), ¶ 30 (June 15, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/21st-report-of-theProsecutor-to-the-UNSC-on-Dafur_%20Sudan.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS58-3C8Q]; International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Ninth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR
1593 (2005), ¶¶ 32, 39 (June 7, 2005), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B97B3A9C0C83-4884-881C-70C1C1EEEA53/280448/9th_UNSCReport_Eng1.pdf; see also Juma, supra note 209, at 305.
213. African Union [AU], Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and The International Criminal Court (ICC), at ¶ 3, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI) (May 26-27,
2013) (“[The Assembly] DEEPLY REGRETS that the request by the African Union (AU) to
the United Nations (UN) Security Council to defer the proceedings initiated against President Omar Al Bashir of The Sudan and Senior State Official of Kenya, in accordance with
Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on deferral of
cases by the UN Security Council, has not been acted upon; REAFFIRMS that Member
States such as the Republic of Chad that had welcomed President Omar Al Bashir of The
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unwillingness to defer ICC proceedings against the head of state in
the Sudan struck many States Parties, especially members of the
AU, as unfair. The legitimacy concerns raised by AU States regarding the ICC targeting Africa are in part attributable to the Prosecutor’s decision to pursue a sitting head of state, but are also related to
a core concern inherent in any Security Council referral of a nonState Party, like Libya. Most recently, South Africa formally notified
the UN of its intentions to withdraw from the Rome Statute in October 2016, 214 as did Gambia and Burundi.215
Aside from possibly self-serving allegations of bias by the AU,
what does the relationship between the Council and the ICC have to
do with States Parties’ perceptions of the ICC’s legitimacy? From one
perspective, the relationship between the ICC and the Council acts as
a balance—ensuring that individuals from any UN member State
could, in principle if not in fact—face criminal process for their actions creating threats to international peace and security.
From many Rome Statute and non-Rome Statute States’ viewpoints, however, rather than strengthening a growing global perception that international criminal law norms will be fairly applied to
hold violators accountable, cases resulting from the Council’s referrals just bolster perceptions of ICC double standards. The concern
regarding double standards accompanies any political Security Council action or inaction—Council members have a marked tendency to
favor their allies, and it is difficult to reach consensus on action
against their allies. The political limitations and strengths of all
Council action are indeed inherent in the design of the organ itself.216
The ICC, however, is a legal institution, unlike the Council, and is
accordingly intended to be impartial and neutral. So, too, the enforcement of criminal law is intended to be impartial. The Court’s
involvement with the Council, therefore, opens it to unique allegations of bias. If more AU members follow through with their claims
that they will withdraw from the ICC 217 and only Latin American,
European, and Asian countries remain, the broad legitimacy that

Sudan did so in conformity with the decisions of the Assembly and therefore, should not
be penalized . . . .”).
214. See Niko Pavlopoulos, South Africa’s Withdrawal: A Lesson Learned?, EJIL:
TALK! (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/south-africas-withdrawal-a-lesson-learned/
[https://perma.cc/5S9B-VEB6].
215. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Burundi: Withdrawal,
C.N.805.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CN/2016/CN.805.2016-Eng.pdf.
216. The Council lacks representation from Africa, the Middle East, or South America
in its permanent membership.
217. See Pizzi, supra note 11.
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the ICC has enjoyed in international criminal law matters will be
deeply endangered.
Even as it exempts a select group of powerful States—namely, the
three permanent Council-Member States (P3) 218 that have veto authority from the Court’s jurisdiction—the Council’s involvement in
the jurisdiction of the ICC also brings non-consenting States within
the ICC’s jurisdiction. Legal formalists might point out that the UN
Charter applies to all States, so as a matter of international law, all
States are already subject to the Council’s political power. A normbased defense of the Council’s ability to refer non-State Parties is
that the Rome Statute broadens the group of States, albeit not to include the P3, to which ICL norms will apply. Council-referrals thus
overcome the understandable concern of ICL advocates that consent
should not be the sole basis for the application of ICL against wrongdoers. Many ICC mandate holders, though, as well as many members
of global civil society, see the Council’s connection to the ICC as enhancing the concern that the ICC—and its Prosecutor—are political
tools of the most powerful countries and the lesson that justice will
apply to all States except the P3—the United States, Russia,
and China.
Indeed, the Council’s role in the ICC was largely a concession to
the interests of the United States during the drafting of the Statute. 219 This matters for many reasons, but especially here, for the
costs to legitimacy and the resulting effects on the ICC’s ability to
achieve its goals. Some readers may object that the political nature of
the Council itself increases the legitimacy of its referrals—and therefore the Prosecutor should be compelled to investigate and prosecute
these referrals. After all, in order to refer a situation, the Council
must first reach agreement that there is a threat to international
peace and security. The Council’s political debates about referring a
situation to the ICC strengthen the perception that the situation
merits attention. The resolutions accompanying these debates, however, have not seriously considered the ICC’s capacity to manage the
resulting cases without accompanying enforcement power from the
Council. It would thus appear that the Council’s involvement in the

218. Jurisdiction would exist over Council P5 members who have allegedly committed
crimes meeting the other standards on the territory of a Member State.
219. The ICC in the Security Council, GLOBAL POL’Y F., https://www.globalpolicy.org/
international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/icc-in-the-security-council-6-4.html
[https://perma.cc/9JPJ-2S7W] (“Under threat of a US veto of all UN peacekeeping missions,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1422 in July 2002, granting Washington a twelvemonth blanket immunity from the ICC. The US again used its veto power and successfully
renewed its immunity arrangement a year later.”).
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ICC’s caseload does not necessarily increase perceptions of the ICC’s
fairness and legitimacy.

B. The Rome System as the Primary Authority in International
Criminal Law
Since 2002, the ICC has occupied an unparalleled position—it is
the central institution in an international framework of ICL. Even as
a relative newcomer to the network of international organizations,
the ICC’s endorsement by 123 States, hundreds of NGOs, and widespread initial buy-in is in many respects more inclusive and thorough
than was the UN at its founding.
As an international tribunal, the ICC is understood to be more of a
rule-bound institution than is the UN, renowned for its political and
supra-legal action. The stories of the founding of the two international entities contributed to perceptions of their respective structural
and source legitimacy. 220 The negotiations leading to the ICC’s establishment are summarized supra in Part II. By contrast, it is wellknown that tremendous asymmetries of power gave birth to the UN’s
Charter. The Council’s composition has been criticized since the moment of the UN’s conception; the need for Council reform emphasized
in many fora. 221 When the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia met at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, their vision of a new world government was one in which they would have sole responsibility to
maintain international peace and security.222 The three powers later
expanded their inner-circle membership to include China and
France, but made it clear to the approximately forty-five States gathered in San Francisco to discuss and ratify the UN Charter in June
1945, that the permanent Council members’ veto power was nonnegotiable. 223 Just three States in Africa attended this founding conference, as the rest were still under the control of colonial powers.
When the five permanent members of the Council made their veto
220. BEETHAM, supra note 25, at 75 (“These various sources of legitimacy, both external and internal to societies, are rooted in clearly distinguishable types of belief system,
each with its own respective interpreters and mode of discourse. Among the most profound
social changes are those marked by a shift in these belief systems that determine the
source of legitimacy for a society’s rules of power: from religious to secular; from external
and universalistic to internal and particularistic; from society as past, to society as its people in the present.”).
221. See U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/followupreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QWT-BB8F];
see also Shany, supra note 13, at 226.
222. DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 20-21 (2009).
223. Id. at 32, 36.
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power a prerequisite to establishing the UN Charter, the New York
Times noted that the community of States “reluctantly accepted the

idea of virtual world dictatorship by the great powers.” 224 Although
the Council has evolved and adapted at the margins, even after decolonization, the end of the Cold War, and many other power shifts,
its permanent membership has remained cemented as its core.
The move to apply law to atrocity famously attempts to cabin the
politicization of conflict resolution. It is therefore not surprising that
during the negotiations to establish the unprecedented ICC, States
Parties were concerned about how best to establish and guard the
political independence of the ICC. This concern was particularly
acute among Southern members. 225 Thus, the relationship between
the ICC and the Security Council was a concern related to the independence of the ICC for many States Parties in the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute.
States adopting the Rome Statute agreed to the Rome Statute’s
explicit division between those States within the Rome framework
and those outside it. However, Council-referrals further affect this
division in two ways: first, by sweeping within the ICC’s jurisdiction
even States that have neither ratified the Rome Statute nor violated
States Parties’ territory, and second, by mostly exempting Council
members with veto power from possible ICC jurisdiction. Of course,
States Parties knew that some members of the P5 would not join the
Rome Statute, so they arguably anticipated this double standard. At
the same time, States Parties arguably did not anticipate that the
Security Council would agree to refer situations to the Court while
simultaneously refusing to provide the resources and support necessary to help the Court proceed in investigating and prosecuting in
these non-States Parties’ territories. As the latter part of this Article
has argued, the relationship with the Council does not, on balance,
strengthen the ICC.
VI. SELECT TRADEOFFS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICC PROSECUTOR
DECLINING A FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL
This Article has investigated why the Prosecutor might wisely
consider declining a Council referral in the interests of justice. Making such a declination might increase the capacity of the Court to fo-

224. Id. at 37.
225. See ICC Plenipotentiaries, supra note 59 (quoting various southern diplomats on
the Security Council’s relationship with the ICC).
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cus its resources and to send a message to the Council that it should
support the progress of the cases resulting from its referrals.226
Saying no to the Council is no simple matter for the Prosecutor,
not least because the PTC will review the decision and the Council
has the power to interfere with the Court’s work by deferring its active cases. If the Prosecutor declined to prosecute, it is unclear
whether the Council would still reap the benefit of having made a
referral and be able to absolve itself of its responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Faced with a refusal from the ICC, might the
Council be catalyzed to respond to non-complying States Parties in
the ongoing investigations?
Readers might recall the backlash sparked by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ)’s 227 refusal to decide the South West Africa cases in 1962 and 1966. African States’ confidence in the ICJ was nearly
irrevocably destroyed when the ICJ dismissed, on technical grounds,
the South West Africa cases, 228 Ethiopia and Liberia’s challenge to
South Africa’s occupation of South West Africa. It was the ICJ’s decision not to decide that created this backlash, and confidence in the
ICJ was not restored until 1971 in the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in
the Namibia case.229
Deciding not to prosecute would indeed be a controversial decision
for the Prosecutor to make, but the Prosecutor has already twice said
yes to the Council when it has made referrals, even when the Council
created added constraints within those referrals. The results, as this
Article has argued, have been at best mixed, and even unhelpful to
the Court. Unlike in the South West Africa cases, the Prosecutor’s
decision not to investigate the Council-referred situation in the interests of justice should happen quickly, not over the course of many
years, as occurred with the ICJ decision (not to decide).

226. A number of audiences will be affected by Prosecutorial decisions. The Prosecutor’s declination will have effects on: (1) victims in the particular conflict situation; (2)
members of the Council, particularly those who are also States Parties; (3) States Parties
that previously wanted the Prosecutor to decline to prosecute—such as Uganda; (4) advocates for international criminal justice; (5) future Council or proprio motu referrals in
which the Prosecutor does proceed; and (6) the Pre-Trial Chamber.
227. A. S. MULLER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE
AFTER FIFTY YEARS 51 (A.S. Muller et al. eds., 1997); Ernest A. Gross, The South West
Africa Case: What Happened?, 45 FOREIGN AFF. 36 (1966).
228. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6
(July, 1966).
229. See generally Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 (1971) (stating that Member States have an
obligation to not enter into treaties with South Africa).
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In addition, parties before the ICJ conceded to submit to its jurisdiction, so its refusal to hear their case creates a unique, unfulfilled
mandate. Although the Rome Statute provides the legal power for the
Court to investigate and prosecute in Council-referred cases, these
cases have been in States that have not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. In addition, the Council has not supported this power in
the ways the Rome Statute contemplated, 230 and the Court is in jeopardy, so ensuring that the Prosecutor can sufficiently investigate is
critical. After the disintegration of the last Kenyan cases against Ruto and Sang in April 2016 231 and the most recent withdrawals of
Gambia, 232 South Africa, and Burundi 233 from the ICC, the Prosecutor
should attempt to shore up perceptions of the ICC’s fairness and effectiveness, by considering steps to ensure that its next cases are
manageable and effectively prosecuted. Specifically, the Prosecutor
might seek to distance her Office from claims of selective justice by
declining to pursue a future Council referral and submitting that decision to the Pre-Trial Chamber for review.
One additional danger of denying a Council referral in the interests of justice is the possibility of alienating the permanent Council
members and States Parties the United Kingdom and France, as well
as supporters of the ICC, and States that likely would have worked to
galvanize the Council’s political will to refer to the ICC. The United
Kingdom and France, along with other European States Parties, are
responsible for a significant portion of the ICC’s funding, and may be
displeased with prosecutorial declination in the short-term. The biggest funder of enforcement in the ad hoc tribunals was the United
States, and the United States has continued to push for ad hoc tribunals, even in the wake of the Rome framework. While a more attenuated possibility, the Prosecutor declining to investigate or to prosecute may well motivate Council members to establish an ad hoc tribunal for situations involving non-State Parties to the Statute, which
might in turn ensure that there is prosecution of the crimes. At the
dawn of the Rome Statute, supporters of the Court hoped future ad
hoc tribunals would not be necessary, but at present, given the politi230. See Akande, supra note 109.
231. Press Release, International Criminal Court, Ruto and Sang Case: ICC Trial
Chamber V(A) Terminates the Case Without Prejudice to Re-Prosecution
(Apr.
5,
2016),
in
Future,
Press
Release
ICC-CPI-20160405-PR1205
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1205&ln=en [https://perma.cc/JD89-6573].
232. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Gambia: Withdrawal,
C.N.862.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Nov. 10, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CN/2016/CN.862.2016-Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/53UE-TE76].
233. U.N. Secretary-General, Depository Notification, Burundi: Withdrawal,
https://treaties.un.org/
C.N.805.2016. TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Oct. 28, 2016),
doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.805.2016-Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNS2-5N2X].
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cal impasse of the Council, it appears some gaps in the jurisdiction of
the ICC may well be filled in this way.
Were the PTC to endorse the Prosecutor’s decision to decline to
prosecute, the relatively low cost to the Council of future referrals
might be raised. This might require Council members to consider in
advance how they might consistently support the referrals. 234 It is
possible that the Council might also, within its existing constraints,
be incentivized to find ways to support its existing referrals. 235
In order for international criminal law norms to be strengthened,
the ICC could focus its efforts on situations in States Parties that
claim to share a stated legal commitment to international criminal
law norms by virtue of their ratification of the Rome Statute, which
is not to say that the Prosecutor will not face obstacles in such situations as well. Eventually, the Prosecutor may expand her declination
to other forms of referrals.
What are some theoretical implications of prosecutorial declination? Prosecutorial declination belies the view that international law
is a system and that the Prosecutor must not use her discretion to
decline to investigate or prosecute Council referrals, because the ICC
is a security court in such instances. Viewing the prosecutor as empowered to decline Council referrals accepts that seats of authority in
the international sphere are increasingly pluralistic. Indeed, it assumes that contests of authority at the international level may contribute to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC. Zeroing in on
the possibility of conflicts between Council determinations and ICC
decisions provides the underpinnings of an argument for a form of
complementarity at the international level, one that places the ICC
in a possibly superior position to the Council in regards to international criminal law. Increasing fragmentation at the international
level opens space both for contestation of authority and specialization, and opens the possibility of multiple seats of legitimacy. Prosecutorial declination of Council referrals may thus serve as a corrective to the theoretical understanding that the UN Charter is the core
234. Given the political nature of the UN Security Council’s actions, consistent support
would still likely be difficult to secure.
235. The United States is forbidden from financially supporting the ICC, so there
would need to be broad Council commitment to establishing a special fund for the Court
that excerpts the United State’s funds or future United States administrations would need
to cultivate a sort of plausible denial about GA funds going to support the ICC, with a particular caveat that those funds do not include the States. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). For a sample of the many suggestions that have been
made to the Council to reform its interactions with the ICC, see True-Frost, International
Civil Servant, supra note 31; True-Frost, Development of Individual Standing, supra note
168. Rebecca Hamilton also suggests that notice to exit situations might incentivize Council support. See Hamilton, supra note 119.
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constitutional document of an international system, and the UN Security Council, with its power to bind Member States, sits at the apex
of this system.
VII. CONCLUSION
The primary goals of this Article have been, first, to explore a path
not yet taken by the Prosecutor in the relationship between the ICC
and the powerful Security Council as a means for increasing the
effectiveness and States Parties’ perceptions of the fairness of the
ICC. Given the power of individual Council members, the
enforcement power of the Council, and the relative lack of power of
the Prosecutor of the ICC, the relationship between the Court and
the Council is also useful for interrogating the point at which
constructivist approaches can be used to leverage change in a
rational-choice-based relationship. While the Prosecutor arguably
does not require enforcement mechanisms to promote norms against
impunity (indeed, some studies indicate enforcement of human rights
norms, for example, may sometimes create backlash), 236 the limits of
constructivist approaches to norm diffusion may be reached when
there is active undermining of those norms by the same powerful
institutions, institutions like the Council, that should be enforcing
and applying the norms. This analysis has demonstrated that
although the goals of international criminal justice are complex, the
relationship with the Council is not only ripe for change, the
Prosecutor has some power to alter it.
For States Parties, the Prosecutor has the potential to be a more
accountable and normatively valid source of international criminal
law norms than is the Council. It may well be that the mandates of
both the ICC and the Council will be better served by the Prosecutor
declining to prosecute Council-referred cases in the short-term.

236. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter et al., Backlash Against International Courts in West,
East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EURO. J. INT’L L. 293, 294 (2016).

